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ABSTRACT 
This Article reconceptualizes citizenship, a notion usually tied to the 
nation state, as “layered.” Human rights may serve as the international 
“layer” of citizenship, addressing nationals and non-nationals alike. It 
took some time, however, for “social” citizenship to emerge as a human 
rights issue and, hence, for human rights to become an international layer 
for social citizenship rights granted on the national level. Around 1993, 
states started to accept a human rights-based obligation toward the poor, 
requiring social policies to focus on targeted, individual welfare. 
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Nowadays, poverty mitigation is the human rights core of “social” 
citizenship. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As a theoretical concept, “citizenship” is familiar to sociologists, 
political scientists, and legal scholars. The meaning of citizenship, 
however, differs widely. Legal scholars and authors theorizing democracy 
tend to use a narrow notion, linking citizenship more or less strictly to 
political rights: Citizenship is supposed to describe the status of 
individuals who have the right to participate directly in decision-making in 
political matters or the right to choose representatives through elections.
1
 
 
 
 1. See generally David Held, Democracy: From City-States to a Cosmopolitan Order?, 40 POL. 
STUD. 10 (Supp. s.1 1992) (tracing the idea of democracy from city-states to liberalism and Marxism); 
Jürgen Habermas, Citizenship and National Identity, in THE CONDITION OF CITIZENSHIP 20 (Bart van 
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These active citizens are defined in a rather exclusionary manner, since 
participatory rights are believed to depend on citizenship acquired 
according to citizenship law (only nationals qualify for the status), 
although some notions of “responsible” or “participatory” citizenship may 
reach beyond decision-making or voting rights in a strict sense.
2
 Scholars 
following T.H. Marshall’s seminal 1950 essay3 conceptualize citizenship 
as a legal status encompassing civil rights, political rights, and social 
rights. Whether narrowly or broadly conceived, citizens are often 
juxtaposed with opposites, at times with burghers or economic citizens,
4
 
but most frequently with aliens whose legal status differs considerably 
from the status of citizens.
5
 Citizenship concepts transcending the nation 
state are either confined to the political in a narrow sense—“world 
citizenship” then refers to democratic participation on the global level6—
or the concepts rely on the (individual) feeling of belonging to the planet.
7
 
In the latter case, global citizenship is not a legal status, but derives from 
 
 
Steenbergen ed., 1994) (stressing popular sovereignty and self-determination as the roots of 
citizenship); Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047 (1994) (equating citizenship with full membership in a political community, a 
status regularly acquired under the rules of citizenship law). 
 2. See, e.g., Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work 
on Citizenship Theory, 104 ETHICS 352 (1994) (contending that the notion of “responsible citizenship” 
encompasses the desirable activities of the “good citizens,” independent of the formal legal status as 
citizen); Kim Rubenstein & Daniel Adler, International Citizenship: The Future of Nationality in a 
Globalized World, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 519 (2000) (differentiating between citizenship as a 
legal status and a broader view of citizenship as a collection of rights, duties, and opportunities for 
participation that define the extent of socio-political membership within a community); Ruth Lister, 
From Object to Subject: Including Marginalised Citizens in Policy Making, 35 POL’Y & POL. 437 
(2007) (taking the normative stance of thinking about “inclusive citizenship,” a concept that reaches 
out to marginalized groups, in particular, people living in poverty and children). 
 3. THOMAS HUMPHREY MARSHALL, Citizenship and Social Class, in CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL 
CLASS AND OTHER ESSAYS 1 (1950). 
 4. Bart van Steenbergen, The Condition of Citizenship: An Introduction, in THE CONDITION OF 
CITIZENSHIP, supra note 1, at 1. 
 5. See, e.g., Bosniak, supra note 1; Linda Bosniak, Constitutional Citizenship through the Prism 
of Alienage, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1285 (2002); Catherine Dauvergne, Citizenship with a Vengeance, 8 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 489 (2007); SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, 
RESIDENTS, AND CITIZENS 1 (2004). 
 6. See, e.g., Held, supra note 1, at 11, 23, 33 (arguing that national democracies require 
international democracy if they are to be sustained in the contemporary era; a “cosmopolitan model of 
democracy” is meant to rely, inter alia, on an international civil society, regional parliaments, or 
referendums cutting across nation-states); Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, Toward Global 
Parliament, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 212 (2001) (investigating the call for greater citizen participation in the 
international order); Daniele Archibugi, Cosmopolitan Democracy and its Critics: A Review, 10 EUR. 
J. INT’L REL. 437 (2004) (defending the project of a cosmopolitan democracy based on global 
movements). 
 7. Archibugi, supra note 6, at 445; see also Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. 
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 448 (2000) (equating world citizenship with loyalty and a moral 
commitment to humanity at large). 
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the individual claim of being an Earth citizen. Either way, citizenship 
concepts seldom connect citizenship and international human rights.
8
 For 
legal scholars, the connection between citizenship and human rights 
indeed seems far-fetched, given their narrow focus on political rights. 
Sociologists and political scientists are silent,
9
 skeptical,
10
 or simply 
equate world citizenship with human rights, yet abstain from reflecting 
upon the relation.
11
 
Part I of this Article contributes to conceptualizing citizenship from the 
perspective of human rights law. Do human rights spell out some 
fundamental elements of citizenship that states need to take into account 
when defining (national) citizenship rights? I will argue that citizenship 
concepts can no longer ignore that the legal status of individuals is—to 
some extent—framed by international human rights law. Parts II and III of 
the Article contribute to the understanding of human rights, in particular 
the understanding of economic and social rights, often termed “second 
generation human rights.”12 Against the backdrop of the concept of 
citizenship, I shall ask: Do second-generation human rights promise what 
Marshall called “social citizenship,” i.e., a particular legal status 
characteristic of the (modern) welfare state? Social citizenship has rarely 
been dealt with, especially in a global setting.
13
 This Article concentrates 
on the rights regime established by the 1966 International Covenant on 
 
 
 8. But see YASEMIN NUHOĞLU SOYSAL, LIMITS OF CITIZENSHIP: MIGRANTS AND 
POSTNATIONAL MEMBERSHIP IN EUROPE (1994); Linda Bosniak, Multiple Nationality and the 
Postnational Transformation of Citizenship, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 979, 985 (2002); Seyla Benhabib, 
Twilight of Sovereignty or the Emergence of Cosmopolitan Norms? Rethinking Citizenship in Volatile 
Times, 11 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 19 (2007). 
 9. See, e.g., Held, supra note 1; MARSHALL, supra note 3; Bryan S. Turner, Outline of a Theory 
of Citizenship, 24 SOC. 189 (1990). 
 10. See infra Part I.A. 
 11. See, e.g., John Boli & George M. Thomas, World Culture in the World Polity: A Century of 
International Non-Governmental Organization, 62 AM. SOC. REV. 171, 182 (1997) (claiming “[w]orld 
citizenship is prominently codified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which depicts a 
global citizen whose rights transcend national boundaries.”). 
 12. See generally Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of 
Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1982) (elaborating on the language of 
“generations” of human rights). 
 13. But see FRANZ-XAVER KAUFMANN, Welfare Internationalism Before the Welfare State, in 
EUROPEAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE WELFARE STATE 94 (John Veit-Wilson trans., 2012) (tracing the 
human rights angle of the welfare state); Hartley Dean, Social Policy and Human Rights: Re-thinking 
the Engagement, 7 SOC. POL’Y & SOC’Y 1 (2007) (contending that national welfare rights provide a 
clearer and more explicit basis for a progressive development of social policies than the human rights 
approach to poverty reduction, espoused, e.g., by the United Nations Development Program); Michael 
Keating, Social Citizenship, Solidarity and Welfare in Regionalized and Plurinational States, 13 
CITIZENSHIP STUD. 501 (2009) (discussing whether boundary-opening and the decentralization of 
states imply a threat to national welfare state regimes by weakening social citizenship). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss2/5
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
14
 The ICESCR 
elaborates in greater detail what had already been proclaimed in the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).
15
 The ICESCR contains 
the very essence of U.N.-sponsored economic and social rights.
16
 These 
rights are the prime candidates for directing social policies at the national 
level and, hence, for promising social citizenship. Part II of the Article 
argues that, historically, economic and social rights embraced a variety of 
state policies aiming at “social welfare.” Marshallian social citizenship 
was not the dominant program. But things changed when U.N.-sponsored 
economic and social rights became the focus of states mandated to 
translate these rights into realities on the ground. Part III of the Article 
explores how the states parties to the ICESCR describe their policies when 
reporting to the committee established under the Covenant in order to 
watch over the implementation of economic and social rights.
17
 I shall 
 
 
 14. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. The ICESCR entered into force on Jan. 3, 1976. See U.N. 
SECRETARY-GENERAL, I MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, at 
158, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/23, U.N. Sales No. E.05.V.3 (2005). 
 15. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217/III, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
 16. The state representatives negotiating on the text of the ICESCR in the late 1940s and early 
1950s did not specifically differentiate between “economic” and “social” rights. What the lawmakers 
used to summarily call “economic and social rights” was eventually listed in ICESCR Articles 6 to 12. 
For an early document, see the draft resolution proposed by the Drafting Committee, a sub-organ of 
the Commission on Human Rights. Drafting Committee on an International Bill of Human Rights, 
Rep. on its 1st Sess., June 9–25, 1947, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/21 (July 1, 1947). Subsequent U.N.-
sponsored human rights treaties rehearse the economic and social rights of the ICESCR, yet do so from 
their specific perspectives. See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women arts. 11–12, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]; Convention on 
the Rights of the Child arts. 24, 26–27, 32, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC]; 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
Their Families arts. 25–28, 43–44, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICRMW]; Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities arts. 25, 27–28, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
CRPD]. 
 17. U.N.-sponsored human rights treaties regularly include a chapter establishing independent 
review committees composed of experts in the field of human rights. The committees are supposed to 
monitor and examine the progress made by the states parties in achieving the realization of the rights 
recognized in the conventions. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 28, 
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (establishing the Human Rights Committee); 
CEDAW, supra note 16, art. 17 (establishing the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women), CRC, supra note 16, art. 43 (establishing the Committee on the Rights of the Child), 
CRPD, supra note 16, art. 34 (establishing the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities). 
At the very least, the reviewing committees are meant to examine reports the states parties are to 
submit periodically. Often, U.N.-sponsored human rights treaties are supplemented by optional 
protocols empowering the review committees to deal with complaints lodged by individuals whose 
rights have, allegedly, been violated. For civil and political rights, see the Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter 
ICCPR-OP]; for the rights of women not to be discriminated against, see the Optional Protocol to the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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demonstrate that the states parties to the ICESCR nowadays increasingly 
talk about policies involving the ingredients of social citizenship. Through 
widespread shifts in the understanding of U.N.-sponsored economic and 
social rights, the granting of social citizenship is no longer just an option 
for implementing states, but about to become an obligation states parties 
cannot escape.  
The arguments of Parts II and III rely on debates driven by state agents 
acting as either state representatives in United Nations lawmaking forums 
(U.N. documents from the 1940s and 1950s) or on reports submitted to the 
reviewing committee under the ICESCR by the states parties (state party 
reports from 1977 to 2011). The choice of sources underlying the Article 
reflects the rules of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT).
18
 Inquiries into the meaning of a (human rights) treaty are meant 
to also have recourse to, inter alia, the preparatory work (travaux 
préparatoires) or state practice subsequent to the entry into force of the 
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation.
19
 For obvious reasons, scholarly work on state practice is 
usually confined to a limited number of case studies compiling domestic 
legislation or domestic jurisprudence.
20
 In order to make the basis for the 
arguments of the Article as broad (and global) as possible, I chose to 
collect and evaluate all the state party reports submitted under the ICESCR 
from 1977 through 2011 (546 reports). These reports are not state practice 
per se, but purport to describe and reflect upon state practice; the reports 
provide firsthand information on the states’ readings of their human rights 
 
 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Oct. 6, 1999, 2131 
U.N.T.S. 83; for the rights of people with disabilities, see the Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/61/611; for the rights of the child, 
see the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications 
procedure, Dec. 19, 2011, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/138 (not yet in force). For the rights laid down by the 
ICESCR, the monitoring framework is—formally—different. According to the wording of the 
ICESCR, states parties to the Covenant undertake to submit their reports on the measures they have 
adopted and the progress made in achieving the observance of the rights recognized therein to the U.N. 
Economic and Social Council [hereinafter ECOSOC] for consideration. ICESCR, supra note 14, 
art. 16. Yet, since 1986, state party reports are to be filed with the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, consisting of eighteen members who are experts with competence in the field of 
human rights and serve in their personal capacity. See infra Part III.A. The Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 10, 2008, U.N. Doc. A/63/435 
[hereinafter ICESCR-OP] allowing for individual complaints (i.e., “communications” submitted by or 
on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals), entered into force on May 5, 2013. 
 18. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter 
VCLT]. 
 19. VCLT, supra note 18, arts. 31(3)(b), 32. 
 20. See, e.g., SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND 
COMPARATIVE LAW (Malcolm Langford ed., 2008). 
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obligations and on how they present the situation on the ground in an 
international forum. If uniform, the reports may indeed indicate agreement 
among the states parties regarding the interpretation of the ICESCR. That 
source of information has never been explored before. Hence, Part II of the 
article provides a novel (historical) account on the birth of U.N.-sponsored 
economic and social rights. Part III presents new empirical data on how 
the states parties to the ICESCR read these rights, covering a period of 
almost four decades. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), other civil 
society actors, or national judiciaries are not within the focus of the 
Article.
21
 
I. CITIZENSHIP CONCEPTS REVISITED 
A. State of the Art: Citizenship and Human Rights as Uneasy Companions 
Studies into citizenship usually start from T.H. Marshall’s essay on 
citizenship and social class.
22
 In that essay, Marshall reflected upon the 
roots of the twentieth century (European) welfare state, just at the time 
when the British welfare state was about to be born. Marshall organized 
his historical narrative along three elements of “citizenship,” a term used 
to denote three particular sets of rights which, he believed, had expanded 
over time.
23
 For Marshall, citizenship clearly pertains to modernity; 
citizenship defines the (legal) position of the individual in a modern nation 
state.
24
 Civil rights (e.g., liberty of the person, freedom of faith, right to 
own property) were the first to come; Marshall dates these rights back to 
the eighteenth century, when modern civil rights had begun to emerge.
25
 
Political rights (primarily voting rights) were added in the nineteenth 
century.
26
 In the twentieth century and inspired by “the modern drive 
towards social equality,”27 citizenship came to also include social rights, 
ranging “from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to 
 
 
 21. But see WILLIAM KOREY, NGOS AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: “A 
CURIOUS GRAPEVINE” (2001); THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS. INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND 
DOMESTIC CHANGE (Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink eds., 1999); Langford, supra 
note 20. 
 22. MARSHALL, supra note 3. 
 23. Marshall speaks of “parts,” “elements,” or “strands” of citizenship when describing and 
analyzing the content of citizenship. MARSHALL, supra note 3, at 10–11. 
 24. According to Marshall, the early twentieth century witnessed “the latest phase of an 
evolution of citizenship which has been in continuous progress for some 250 years.” MARSHALL, 
supra note 3, at 10. 
 25. Id. at 14, 21, 41. 
 26. Id. at 14, 19. 
 27. Id. at 10. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a 
civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society.”28 
For the purposes of this Part of the Article, the most interesting part of 
Marshall’s essay is how he characterizes “rights.” Four characteristics 
seem pertinent. First, unlike entitlements prevailing in the pre-modern era, 
citizenship rights do not relate to birth or class.
29
 The rights are created, 
not god-given or inferred from reason. Secondly, the rights are individual 
rights, bestowed upon singular human beings (not upon groups or on 
account of group membership).
30
 Thirdly, the rights are believed to be 
equal, i.e., the same for all who are full members of the community of 
citizens.
31
 In other words, the rights are not a priori different for different 
societal strata, although some rights may depend on age, competence, or 
qualification, and although the actual rights of “rights holder A” might 
differ from the rights of “rights holder B” (e.g., because A owns property, 
while B does not). Marshall speaks of “a kind of basic human equality”32 
deemed compatible with social inequality caused by unequal abilities or 
fortune.
33
 Fourthly, the rights Marshall conceptualized are bound to the 
state level.
34
 Citizenship rights are fought for on the state level and granted 
by the nation state, the entity empowered to decide who is—via 
citizenship—included as citizen or, as non-citizen, excluded. 
At the time of Marshall’s writing, initiatives for the creation of an 
international human rights regime were well underway.
35
 From early 1946 
 
 
 28. Id. at 10–11. 
 29. Marshall made a strict difference between membership in a feudal society and modern 
citizenship. Id. at 12. 
 30. Marshall clearly envisioned individualized rights when he talked about citizenship rights. See 
id. at 12 (“civil rights of the individual”), 17 (“individual economic freedom”), 20 (“manhood 
suffrage”), 22 (“right to work where and at what you pleased under a contract of your own making”). 
 31. “Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who 
possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed.” Id. 
at 28. 
 32. Id. at 8. 
 33. Marshall deemed citizenship to be compatible with the inequalities instituted and generated 
by social class. For Marshall, citizenship implied equality in some respects (“basic equality”); in 
certain other respects, however, citizenship itself was considered “the architect of legitimate social 
inequality.” Id. at 9. 
 34. “[The] citizenship whose history I want to trace is, by definition, national.” Id. at 12. 
 35. For a historical overview on initiatives and post-war human rights lawmaking see A.W. 
BRIAN SIMPSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE: BRITAIN AND THE GENESIS OF THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION 157 (2001); PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS: VISIONS SEEN 135 (2d ed. 2003). For a contemporary legal perspective see HERSCH 
LAUTERPACHT, AN INTERNATIONAL BILL OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN (1945); Eleanor Roosevelt, The 
Promise of Human Rights, 26 FOREIGN AFF. 470 (1948); Benjamin V. Cohen, Human Rights Under 
the United Nations Charter, 14 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 430 (1949); Sanford Fawcett, A British View of 
the Covenant, 14 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 438 (1949); Arthur N. Holcombe, The Covenant on Human 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss2/5
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through December 1948, U.N. forums negotiated on the text of the first 
catalogue of human rights ever agreed upon beyond the nation state, 
solemnly proclaimed as the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” on 
December 10, 1948.
36
 From 1949 through 1966, U.N. organs dealt with 
the texts of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the ICESCR, international treaties meant to be binding for 
member states and to complete the envisaged International Bill of 
Rights.
37
 Still, Marshall chose to ignore the international dimension of 
rights, as did many other sociologists.
38
 Some sociologists, however, take 
a skeptical stand. Bryan S. Turner, for example, proceeds from the 
assumption that human rights imply a universalistic human ontology that 
would be difficult to accept for sociologists.
39
 For sociologists, so he 
claims, “a sociology of citizenship has functioned as a substitute for a 
sociology of rights.”40 Turner views “citizenship” and “human rights” as 
clearly opposed. Turner describes citizenship as culturally specific to 
 
 
Rights, 14 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 413 (1949); Frank E. Holman, International Proposals Affecting 
So-Called Human Rights, 14 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 479 (1949); HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1950); NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, THE UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ITS ORIGIN, SIGNIFICANCE, APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION 
(1958); JOHN P. HUMPHREY, HUMAN RIGHTS & THE UNITED NATIONS: A GREAT ADVENTURE (1984). 
 36. At its first session from January 23 through February 18, 1946, the ECOSOC established a 
“nucleus” Commission on Human Rights; at its second session from May 25 to June 21, 1946, the 
ECOSOC adopted the terms of reference for the (full) commission. Rep. of the Econ. & Soc. Council, 
Jan. 23–Feb. 18, May 25–June 21, Sept. 11–Oct. 3, 1946, ¶¶ 6, 46, U.N. Doc. A/125 (Oct. 21, 1946). 
The terms of reference for the Commission on Human Rights included, inter alia, to submit proposals, 
recommendations and reports to the ECOSOC regarding an “international bill of rights.” Id. ¶ 47. 
From early on, there was consensus among the delegates to the Commission on Human Rights that the 
“international bill of rights” should first take the form of a—legally non-binding—resolution to be 
submitted to and approved by the U.N. General Assembly. See Rep. of the Comm’n on Human Rights, 
1st Sess., Jan. 27–Feb. 10, 1947, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. E/259 (1947). The Commission on Human Rights 
finished its preparatory work on the draft Declaration in the summer of 1948. See Rep. of the Comm’n 
on Human Rights, 3d Sess., May 24–June 18, 1948, U.N. Doc. E/800 (June 28, 1948). 
 37. Deliberations in the Commission on Human Rights on what would become the ICCPR, the 
ICESCR, and the ICCPR-OP continued until the spring of 1954. See the final drafts in Rep. of the 
Comm’n on Human Rights, 10th Sess., Feb. 23—April 16, 1954, U.N. Doc. E/2573 (April 1954). 
Thereafter, the drafts were dealt with by the ECOSOC and the General Assembly. The drafts were 
eventually adopted by the General Assembly on December 16, 1966. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Jan. 1, 1967). 
 38. See, e.g., Michael Ignatieff, The Myth of Citizenship, 12 QUEEN’S L.J. 399 (1987) (using an 
ideal type of citizenship to criticize neo-liberal thinking as an attack on national citizenship rights); 
Michael Mann, Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship, 21 SOC. 339 (1987) (pointing to some 
shortcomings of Marshall’s theory from the perspective of comparative historical analysis of nation-
states). See also Rhiannon Morgan, Introduction: Human Rights Research and the Social Sciences, in 
INTERPRETING HUMAN RIGHTS: SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 1 (Rhiannon Morgan & Bryan S. 
Turner eds., 2009) (generally reflecting on the neglect of human rights in the social sciences). 
 39. Bryan S. Turner, Outline of a Theory of Human Rights, 27 SOC. 489, 495–96 (1993).  
 40. Id. at 496. 
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Western traditions,
41
 as bound to the nation-state,
42
 and as contingent.
43
 
Human rights, on the other hand, are supposed to be universal, not tied to 
the nation-state, and progressive.
44
 Yet, even though Turner favors 
citizenship, he accepts human rights as “a necessary supplement to 
citizenship.”45 Human rights, he contends, may be useful to 
counterbalance the erosion of citizenship on the state level and to protect 
against state power.
46
 Kate Nash, another prominent critic, asserts that 
human rights fail to effectively protect the weak.
47
 Nash concedes that, 
nowadays, human rights are no longer mere aspirations, but legalized 
through binding international treaties and, therefore, part of what could be 
called “cosmopolitan law,” i.e., law guaranteeing rights regardless of 
(national) citizenship status.
48
 Nash is nonetheless suspicious of human 
rights because, in practice, human rights would contribute to “the 
institutionalization of new and very complex inequalities”49 and to a 
protracted “complication of citizenship.”50 Nash contends in particular that 
“a proliferation of statuses” is being “produced out of the interplay of 
citizenship and human rights.”51 In her analysis of the different types of 
status produced by the interplay of citizenship and human rights, she 
makes out five classes of citizens: super-citizens, marginal citizens, quasi-
citizens, sub-citizens, and un-citizens.
52
 According to Nash, the group of 
super-citizens consists of highly mobile citizens in secure employment 
able to move freely across borders.
53
 Marginal citizens are citizens who 
could not enjoy full citizenship on account of poverty or racial 
discrimination.
54
 Quasi-citizens are resident denizens whose status remains 
precarious.
55
 Sub-citizens are non-citizens who are not allowed to have 
paid employment and are denied access to state benefits (e.g., asylum 
 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 497. 
 43. Id. at 498. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Bryan S. Turner, Preface, in CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL THEORY ix (Bryan S. Turner ed., 
1993). 
 46. See Bryan S. Turner, A Sociology of Citizenship and Human Rights: Does Social Theory still 
Exist?, in INTERPRETING HUMAN RIGHTS: SOCIAL SCIENCES PERSPECTIVES, supra note 38, at 177, 
184–85. 
 47. Kate Nash, Between Citizenship and Human Rights, 43 SOC. 1067, 1075 (2009). 
 48. Id. at 1070–71. 
 49. Id. at 1070. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at 1072. 
 52. Id. at 1073. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. at 1076–78. 
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seekers).
56
 Finally, the group of un-citizens comprises undocumented 
migrants or people detained in “non-places,” such as Guantanamo Bay.57 
For most of these more or less unfortunate classes of citizens, human 
rights would simply be irrelevant.
58
 
The reasons given for keeping citizenship and human rights separate or 
for being suspicious of human rights are not very forceful in either 
Turner’s or Nash’s contentions. Turner’s assumption that theorizing 
human rights presupposes a universalistic human ontology is simply an 
overstatement. A sociological theory concentrating on human rights law as 
a starting point avoids these difficulties.
59
 Turner’s juxtapositions are even 
more problematic. Human rights are also frequently classified as 
“Western” by a wide range of scholars.60 Human rights are also tied to the 
nation-state,
61
 and human rights are also historically contingent.
62
 Nash’s 
objections are not convincing either. It might be true that there is a recent 
proliferation of statuses instead of an equalization of the rights of nationals 
and non-nationals. But these inequalities can hardly be attributed to human 
rights law. Very often, the inferior status of non-nationals (and also of 
nationals) is created by state action that contradicts constitutional 
guarantees or international human rights law. The United States, for 
example, faces strong criticism by national courts and relevant human 
rights treaty bodies under the ICCPR or the Committee Against Torture 
(CAT) for detaining suspects indefinitely and without access to an 
adequate remedy at Guantanamo Bay or other theaters of armed conflict, 
such as Iraq or Afghanistan.
63
 A more convincing objection is that human 
 
 
 56. Id. at 1078. 
 57. Id. at 1078–79. 
 58. Id. at 1075. 
 59. ANTHONY WOODIWISS, MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS WORK GLOBALLY 15 (2003). 
 60. See, e.g., R. Panikkar, Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept?, 30 DIOGENES 75 
(1982); Jack Donnelly, Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western 
Conceptions of Human Rights, 76 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 303 (1982); Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism 
and Universal Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 400 (1984); Abdullahi An-Na’Im, What Do We Mean 
by Universal?, 4/5 INDEX ON CENSORSHIP 120 (1994); Makau wa Mutua, The Banjul Charter and the 
African Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Language of Duties, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 339 (1995); 
Makau wa Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 589 (1996); Yash Ghai, 
Universalism and Relativism: Human Rights as a Framework for Negotiating Interethnic Claims, 21 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1095 (2000); Anthony Woodiwiss, Human Rights and the Challenge of 
Cosmopolitanism, 19 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC. 139 (2002). 
 61. See infra Part III. 
 62. SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2010) (contending that, 
historically, there is not one universalism of rights, but only a rivalry of universalisms). 
 63. For criticisms on the national level, see, in particular, the opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (confirming that detainees held at Guantanamo Bay have 
the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus enabling them to contest the lawfulness of their 
detention); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding that newly established military 
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rights do not sufficiently protect certain groups from being marginalized, 
because pertinent norms are missing or ineffective. However, the lack of 
norms does not (necessarily) invalidate the protection afforded by existing 
norms. And ineffectiveness is a problem, for human rights law and for 
citizenship. The effectiveness of international human rights as well as of 
national citizenship rights depends on the existence of legal norms, 
institutions, the commitment of state organs to favor law over politics, and 
a cultural environment that is conducive to adherence to international and 
domestic rights.
64
 
B. Moving Forward: “Layered” Citizenship 
This Article proposes to fill in Marshall’s blind spot and, when 
conceptualizing citizenship, to acknowledge that “rights” have been 
adopted into international law, primarily through the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR as the main pillars of the International Bill of Rights, but also by 
 
 
commissions were deficient from the perspective of national law and international humanitarian law); 
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that statutory law conferred on the district court 
jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus challenges by non-nationals detained at the Naval Base at 
Guantanamo Bay); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (emphasizing that the citizen-detainee, 
seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant, was entitled to receive notice of the 
factual basis for his classification and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions 
before a neutral decision-maker). For an overview on domestic legal debates see Michael Greenberger, 
You Ain’t Seen Nothin’ Yet: The Inevitable Post-Hamdan Conflict Between the Supreme Court and the 
Political Branches, 66 MD. L. REV. 805 (2007); James Park, Effectuating Principles of Justice in 
Ending Indefinite Detention: Historical Repetition and the Case of the Uyghurs, 31 WHITTIER L. REV. 
785 (2010); Susan Akram, Do Constitutions Make a Difference as Regards the Protection of 
Fundamental Human Rights? Comparing the United States and Israel, in THE DYNAMICS OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE AGE OF GLOBALISATION 89 (Morly Frishman & Sam Muller eds., 2010); 
Kristine A. Huskey, Guantanamo and Beyond: Reflections on the Past, Present and Future of 
Preventive Detention, 9 U.N.H. L. REV. 183 (2011); Jennifer L. Milko, Separation of Powers and 
Guantanamo Detainees: Defining the Proper Rules of the Executive and Judiciary in Habeas Cases 
and the Need for Supreme Guidance, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 173 (2012). On the international level, the 
indefinite detention without charges of “unlawful enemy combatants” and under circumstances 
involving allegations of maltreatment was reproached by both the review committee under the ICCPR 
and the review committee under CAT. See Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under 
Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm., United States of 
America, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (Dec. 18, 2006), and Consideration of Reports 
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention, Conclusions and Recommendations 
of the Committee Against Torture, United States of America, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (July 25, 
2006) (rejecting the contention put forward by the Bush administration that human rights lacked 
applicability outside the territory of the United States). 
 64. On processes of “internalization” and compliance see generally Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do 
Nations Obey International Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) (stressing transnational interactions 
between states and non-state actors conducive to obedience and rule compliance); Kiyoteru Tsutsui & 
Hwa Ji Shin, Global Norms, Local Activism, and Social Movement Outcomes: Global Human Rights 
and Resident Koreans in Japan, 55 SOC. PROBS. 391 (2008) (emphasizing the importance of local 
social movements). 
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subsequent U.N. human rights treaties focusing on individuals or groups 
deemed particularly vulnerable, such as individuals discriminated against 
on account of race, color, descent or national or ethnic origin,
65
 women,
66
 
children,
67
 migrant workers,
68
 and people with disabilities.
69
 Prima facie, 
these rights share the basic characteristics of citizenship rights described 
by Marshall; they are framed as individual rights, they are instituted by 
international lawmakers, and they are, basically, equal rights. The 
existence of (international) human rights law may have important bearings 
on the concept of citizenship. 
First, and generally, states are no longer the sole creators of citizenship 
rights, and they are no longer free to decide on whether or not they want to 
grant rights. Instead, states may be obliged by human rights law to accord 
certain rights (such as property rights, the right to marry, or freedom of 
religion) or to ensure certain institutional outcomes sketched by 
international human rights treaties (such as the availability of effective 
remedies or of affordable housing), a situation often described as a loss of 
sovereignty.
70
 From the individual perspective, one could poignantly say, 
“[i]nternationally based citizenship entails the right to have rights,” to pick 
up on Hannah Arendt’s famous dictum.71 Given the state of international 
law, however, this right is—on the global level—not enforceable through 
international litigation initiated by the individuals concerned. An 
international court of human rights has not (yet) been established. The 
term “human rights” rather denotes duties of states backed by an 
international control mechanism operating independently of individual 
complaints, such as state reporting and monitoring by a panel of 
independent experts; more and more frequently, however, that basic 
 
 
 65. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 
1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter ICERD] (obliging states to pursue a policy of elimination of 
racial discrimination, in particular to eradicate racial segregation and apartheid). 
 66. CEDAW, supra note 16 (obliging states to pursue a policy of eliminating discrimination 
against women, inter alia, by embodying the principle of the equality of men and women in their 
national constitutions or other appropriate legislations or other means). 
 67. CRC, supra note 16 (specifying the rights proclaimed in the International Bill of Rights for 
“every human being below the age of eighteen years”). 
 68. ICRMW, supra note 16 (obliging states to grant certain rights to migrant workers). 
 69. CRPD, supra note 16 (obliging states to promote, protect, and ensure the full and equal 
enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities, and to 
promote respect for their inherent dignity). 
 70. See, e.g., Christine Min Wotipka & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Global Human Rights and State 
Sovereignty: State Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1965–2001, 23 SOC. FORUM 
724, 725 (2008). See also Bosniak, supra note 8, at 1001 (contending that citizenship is taking 
increasingly “postnational” form). 
 71. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 296 (1958). 
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mechanism is supplemented by a mechanism involving the assessment of 
individual cases.
72
 The lack of enforceability has led legal scholars to 
question whether human rights are indeed rights in a legal sense.
73
 
Secondly, states have nonetheless not been dethroned when it comes to 
defining citizenship rights. Human rights law circumscribes what states 
owe to individuals in a very rudimentary manner; often, human rights 
language deliberately allows for differing interpretations when states move 
to fulfil the promises made by human rights provisions.
74
 Still, discretion 
of the implementing states is not unlimited. When adhering to 
international human rights treaties, states accept some form of external 
review. At the very least, states agree to regularly report to committees 
composed of experts and to engage with their “observations.”75 States may 
also accept a mechanism allowing for individual complaints that may lead 
to (non-judicial) “views” by the committees.76 Either way, reviewing 
 
 
 72. On the mechanisms securing the implementation of U.N.-sponsored human rights by the 
states parties, see supra note 17. The assessment of an individual case usually starts with a 
“communication” lodged by the individual concerned. After the examination of the case, the reviewing 
committee issues a “view.” These views are not legally binding for the parties involved. On the 
complaints procedure and the legal character of the “view,” see CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, HUMAN 
RIGHTS: BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM 220 (2d ed. 2008); MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT 
ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 894 (2d ed. 2005). 
 73. See, in particular, the early contributions to the discussion by E.W. Vierdag, The Legal 
Nature of the Rights Granted by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
9 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 69, 73–74 (1978) (stressing that “real rights” presuppose enforceability in a 
court of law); Louis Henkin, International Human Rights as “Rights”, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 425, 438–
446 (1979) (cautioning against too narrow a notion of “rights” and suggesting to also accept claims as 
deriving from legal rights when the claims are recognized by law as valid and bolstered by remedies in 
the hands of other forces, such as states or reviewing committees). 
 74. Economic and social rights are, by their very nature, deemed to escape attempts to formulate 
their content with precision. See, e.g., Myres S. McDougal & Gerhard Bebr, Human Rights in the 
United Nations, 58 AM. J. INT’L L. 603, 620 (1964). Yet even civil and political rights sometimes 
resort to vague and ambiguous language and, hence, need to be interpreted and concretized, for 
instance, by the states parties to the ICCPR that seek to implement these rights in their various 
domestic venues. On the states’ responsibilities in the context of implementation (and their discretion), 
see generally WALTER KÄLIN & JÖRG KÜNZLI, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
PROTECTION 125, 184 (2009). 
 75. See ICCPR, supra note 17, arts. 28, 40; ICESCR, supra note 14, arts. 16, 23; and ESC Res. 
1985/17, Resolutions & Decisions of the Econ. & Soc. Council Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. E/1985/85 at 
15 (1986). The documents establishing the reviewing committees under the ICCPR and the ICESCR 
did not explicitly envisage the committees formally adopting “concluding observations” when 
reviewing state party reports. At the beginning of the 1990s, however, the adoption of “concluding 
observations” was already a common practice. For the committee under ICESCR see Comm. on Econ., 
Soc. & Cultural Rights, Rep. on its 5th Sess., Nov. 26—Dec. 14, 1990, ¶¶ 20–46, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 
(1990) (giving a detailed account on the working methods of the committee). 
 76. For the rights laid down by the ICCPR, see ICCPR-OP, supra note 17, art. 5. 
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committees may, following their own interpretation, criticize state practice 
as incompatible with human rights law.
77
 
Hence, citizenship is best conceptualized as “layered.” In so far as 
international human rights treaties embody individual rights, they are the 
same for all human beings staying in the territories of member states. And, 
since U.N.-sponsored human rights treaties are by now almost global in 
scope, the international layer of citizenship is close to universal, some 
important non-ratifiers notwithstanding.
78
 The international layer of 
citizenship may then be complemented by a national layer of rights. The 
national layer includes the rights states create in the process of 
implementation. The committees under the ICCPR and the ICESCR insist 
that these rights be, in principle, enforceable by (national) courts.
79
  
 
 
 77. The reporting mechanisms established by human rights treaties are generally thought to be 
ineffective in comparison to remedies involving court litigation, such as the remedy available under 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 
1950, E.T.S. No. 5 (application to the European Court of Human Rights). That assumption, however, 
proves quite doubtful when tested against the willingness of states to comply with the rulings of the 
European Court of Human Rights. See Ulrike Davy, Welche rechtlichen Grundregeln müssen für einen 
wirksamen Menschenrechtsschutz gelten? Bedeutung gerichtlicher und außergerichtlicher 
Schutzverfahren [What are the prerequisites for an effective human rights protection], in GRUND-
RECHTSMONITORING. CHANCEN UND GRENZEN AUSSERGERICHTLICHEN MENSCHENRECHTSSCHUTZES 
[HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING. PR0S AND CONS OF A NON-JUDICIAL MECHANISM FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS] 238 (Christoph Gusy ed., 2011) (exploring arguments and giving 
empirical details on reporting mechanisms and individual complaint procedures). 
 78. The number of ICCPR member states, for instance, reaches 167; the number of the ICESCR 
states parties equals 161. See U.N. Secretary-General, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the 
Secretary-General Ch. IV: Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https:// 
treaties.un.org/pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). The United 
States, South Africa, Mozambique, Botswana, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, and Cuba stand out among the ICESCR-non-ratifiers. The ICERD is, as of now, 
ratified by 176 states; CEDAW has 187 states parties; the number of the states parties of CRC reaches 
193; the ICRMW has been ratified by 46 states; and the membership count of the most recent human 
rights treaty—the CRPD—is already 138. Id. 
 79. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31 on the Nature of the General Obligation 
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004) 
(elaborating on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on states parties to the Covenant, 
finding that the ICCPR includes a duty of the states parties to ensure that individuals have accessible 
and effective remedies to vindicate their rights in the domestic sphere); General Comment No. 3 on the 
Nature of States Parties Obligations, ¶ 5 (Dec. 11, 1990) (underlining the importance of judicial 
remedies for the appropriate promotion of economic, social and cultural rights), in Comm. on Econ., 
Soc. & Cultural Rights, Rep. on its 5th Sess., Nov. 26–Dec. 14, 1990, at 83, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 
(1991). 
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II. HUMAN RIGHTS LAWMAKING: SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP GOING 
INTERNATIONAL? 
This Part of the Article turns from theorizing citizenship to human 
rights law—more specifically, to U.N.-sponsored economic and social 
rights—and it does so from the perspective of citizenship. When economic 
and social rights were incorporated into the first human rights catalogs 
(UDHR, ICESCR), the rights were considered to be “new” rights 
compared to civil and political rights and their longstanding history.
80
 This 
Article asks: Are U.N.-sponsored economic and social rights the 
international layer of “social citizenship,” or, put differently, do U.N.-
sponsored economic and social rights oblige states to grant rights 
qualifying for “social citizenship”? A layered concept of citizenship 
indeed suggests prima facie that U.N.-sponsored economic and social 
rights have implications for social citizenship. The substantive articles of 
the ICESCR constantly refer to “rights.” The right to work, for instance, is 
a “right of everyone.”81 The same holds true for the right to the enjoyment 
of just and favorable conditions of work,
82
 the right to social security,
83
 or 
the right to an adequate standard of living.
84
 Yet what the implications are 
is far from obvious. Human rights language may be deceptive. For one, the 
notion of social citizenship usually captures the emergence of the 
European welfare state early in the twentieth century.
85
 It seems 
improbable that a Western-born idea simply travelled to the international 
level. For another, it is to be expected that the formulas adopted for 
circumscribing economic and social rights are particularly broad in 
meaning. States were deeply at odds over these rights when the texts were 
negotiated.
86
 A proper answer to the question hence requires an 
investigation into, first, the concept of “social citizenship” and, second, the 
 
 
 80. Hernan Santa Cruz, delegate of Chile to the Commission on Human Rights, was one of the 
most persistent champions for the insertion of economic and social rights into the International Bill of 
Human Rights. As early as the summer of 1947, Santa Cruz insisted that the UDHR “should include 
all the points that humanity expects to be included at this point of our history,” and that meant, in 
particular, “that economic and social rights be assured.” Drafting Committee on an International Bill 
of Human Rights, 7th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.7 (June 17, 1947). 
 81. ICESCR art. 6 
 82. Id. art. 7. 
 83. Id. art. 9. 
 84. Id. art. 11. 
 85. See, e.g., FRANZ-XAVER KAUFMANN, Introduction: A Sociological Perspective, in 
EUROPEAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE WELFARE STATE, supra note 13, at 1, 20, 28. 
 86. For an overview on the debates leading up to the adoption of the UDHR, see JOHANNES 
MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS, DRAFTING & INTENT 157, 
191 (1999). 
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rights language of the ICESCR and the UDHR, which is, in its historical 
dimension, accessible through the travaux préparatoires. 
A. Social Citizenship 
To better grasp the meaning of “social citizenship,” it seems helpful to 
go back to Marshall’s essay on citizenship and social class.87 According to 
Marshall, social rights were late-comers on the national level; they were 
introduced only after civil and political rights had already been 
guaranteed—in particular, after the working class had gained voting 
rights.
88
 Social rights imply what Marshall called an “absolute right” to a 
certain standard of civilization (provided for by the state).
89
 The rights do 
not depend on the economic value of the claimant.
90
 On the contrary, 
social rights in their modern form are deemed to “imply an invasion of 
contract by status” and to symbolize the “subordination of market price to 
social justice, the replacement of the free bargain by the declaration of 
rights.”91 In their normative background, Marshall asserted, social rights 
differed significantly from the old poor laws of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries.
92
 From the perspective of the poor laws, poverty 
was an irritation of the good order. Poor laws were about abating “the 
nuisance of poverty without disturbing the pattern of inequality of which 
poverty was the most obvious unpleasant consequence.”93 Social rights—
that is, Marshall’s contention—were based on a different understanding of 
equality. Social rights became a political issue when the (normative) idea 
of equality had come to encompass not just formal legal equality, but also 
socioeconomic equality; social rights signify the “abolition” of inequality, 
at least with respect to “the essentials of social welfare.”94 Marshall 
expected social rights to have the potential for far-reaching consequences: 
the aim of social rights was not only to raise the “floor-level in the 
basement of the social edifice,” but to “remodel the whole building.”95 
Politically, Marshall attributed social rights to the struggle of workers for 
more equality, a struggle that began when citizenship and capitalism had 
 
 
 87. MARSHALL, supra note 3. 
 88. Id. at 46–47. 
 89. Id. at 43. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 68. 
 92. Id. at 22–24. 
 93. Id. at 46. 
 94. Id. at 47. 
 95. Id. 
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come to be perceived as opposing concepts, with citizenship promising 
equality and capitalism furthering inequality.
96
 
Marshall’s picture of social rights is clearly marred by historical 
contingencies. That is true for the alleged order of the emergence of civil, 
political, and social rights, the contention that social rights coincided with 
the rise of a powerful labor movement, and the assumption that social 
rights were intrinsically linked to developing capitalist economies first as 
friends, then as foes. All of this may be correct for Great Britain at the turn 
of the nineteenth century.
97
 Marshall’s account certainly does not capture 
the situation of the global players engaging in human rights lawmaking 
after 1945. Therefore, this Article proceeds from a definition that retains 
just three (more abstract) elements of Marshall’s description. Social rights 
constituting social citizenship principally envision individuals as rights 
holders, not groups (though they may include trade union rights); the duty 
to fulfil the right is on the side of the state, though the state may, when 
fulfilling those rights, create duties for employers, trade unions, providers 
of health services, or even family members; the rights aim at moderating 
inequalities, especially in the socioeconomic sphere; the rights are 
embedded in some notion of social justice calling for more equality; the 
rights bypass the laws of the market; and the rights are not accorded on 
account of the market-value of the rights holder’s labor.  
The definition discards the contingencies of Marshall’s concept, yet 
still retains the main characteristics of social policy under the Western 
welfare state Marshall had in mind when elaborating on “social 
citizenship.”98 Do the rights enshrined in human rights law imply such a 
notion of social citizenship? 
B. Economic and Social Rights: The Making of the UDHR 
U.N. forums dealt with the three pillars of the International Bill of 
Rights—UDHR, ICCPR, and ICESCR—between February 1946 and 
December 1966. In February 1946, a nucleus Commission on Human 
 
 
 96. Id. at 29. 
 97. The historical accuracy of Marshall’s account is, in fact, contested. See, e.g., Mann, supra 
note 38 (giving a more differentiated picture of the emergence of modern citizenship). I do not want to 
go into the details of accuracy here. 
 98. For a detailed (theoretical and comparative) analysis of the various Western welfare regimes 
see FRANZ-XAVER KAUFMANN, VARIATIONS OF THE WELFARE STATE: GREAT BRITAIN, SWEDEN, 
FRANCE AND GERMANY BETWEEN CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM 28–45 (Springer Science+Business 
Media 2013) (arguing that welfare states are primarily characterized by a politics of inclusion, 
whereby the state resumes a collective responsibility for welfare of the citizens, without abolishing the 
market forces). 
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Rights was established.
99
 Based on the report of the commission,
100
 the 
U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) transformed the nucleus 
commission into the regular eighteen-member Commission on Human 
Rights in June 1946.
101
 In December 1966, the Covenants were finally 
adopted by the U.N. General Assembly.
102
 Most of the hard drafting work 
took place in the Commission on Human Rights. From the spring of 1946 
through the end of 1948, the Commission on Human Rights dedicated a 
great deal of time to discussing drafts and compromise formulas with 
respect to the text of the UDHR.
103
 From 1949 through the spring of 1954, 
the Commission on Human Rights debated and finalized the drafts of the 
Covenants.
104
 
From early on, the members of the Commission on Human Rights 
agreed that the International Bill of Rights would reach beyond the rights 
traditionally laid down by national rights catalogs—soon to be termed 
“civil and political rights.” The bill was also supposed to include what 
were called “economic and social rights” or “social rights.”105 The reasons 
given for the inclusion of this new set of rights remained rather vague, 
though. Economic and social rights were simply thought to symbolize a 
“stage in development” (per René Cassin of France),106 “modernity” or 
 
 
 99. ESC Res. 5 (I), U.N. Doc. E/27 (Feb. 16, 1946) (establishing a Commission on Human 
Rights and a Sub-Commission on the Status of Women). 
 100. Rep. of the Comm’n on Human Rights, Apr. 29–May 20, 1946, U.N. Doc. E/38/Rev.1 (May 
21, 1946). 
 101. ESC Res. 9 (II), U.N. Doc. E/56/Rev.2 (July 1, 1946) (on the Commission on Human 
Rights). 
 102. The texts of the ICESCR, the ICCPR, and the ICCPR-OP were adopted by resolution of the 
General Assembly on December 16, 1966. See G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), supra note 37. 
 103. So far, the most comprehensive historical account is provided by MORSINK, supra note 86. 
See also Susan Waltz, Universalizing Human Rights: The Role of Small States in the Construction of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 44 (2001) (arguing that the main 
narrative of the human rights historiography neglects the contributions of small states); Susan Waltz, 
Reclaiming and Rebuilding the History of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 23 THIRD 
WORLD Q. 437 (2002) (deconstructing four myths relating to the political history of the UDHR); 
MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001) (elaborating on the personal contributions of the main actors 
in the relevant U.N. forums); ROGER NORMAND & SARAH ZAIDI, HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE UN: THE 
POLITICAL HISTORY OF UNIVERSAL JUSTICE (2008) (giving a political and historical overview on the 
emergence and the development of the human rights movement in the twentieth century). 
 104. See the final drafts in Rep. of the Comm’n on Human Rights, supra note 37, at 62, 65. 
 105. In December 1947, the Commission on Human Rights decided, based on a report of its 
Drafting Committee, to proceed to the consideration of all suggested draft articles, including articles 
pertaining to the right to work, the right to good working conditions, the right to rest and leisure, the 
right to health, and the right to social security. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. on its 2d Sess., Dec. 
2–17, 1947, at 4, U.N. Doc. E/600 (Dec. 17, 1947); Drafting Committee on an International Bill of 
Human Rights, supra note 16. 
 106. Comm’n on Human Rights, 72d mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.72 (June 14, 1948) 
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“progress” (per Enrique V. Corominas of Argentina),107 or were accepted 
because personal liberty required some form of economic security (per 
Eleanor Roosevelt of the United States of America).
108
 Still, reaching 
consensus on how to formulate these rights proved difficult. The various 
positions put forward in the debates can clearly be attributed to four 
groups of states, and each group had a distinct take on economic and 
social rights. The groups encompass the Latin American states, the United 
States and its Western European allies, the Eastern European countries, 
and the Arab and Asian states. 
The Latin American states were the first to make a strong move in 
favor of a new set of rights. Cuba submitted a draft in February 1946,
109
 
Panama followed suit in October 1946,
110
 and Chile in January 1947.
111
 
The Latin American move was obviously inspired by newly enacted Latin 
American constitutions that the delegates deemed more advanced than the 
United States or the European constitutions.
112
 The early twentieth century 
Latin American constitutions had indeed struck a quite unique balance 
between liberalism and socialism.
113
 The Latin American constitutions 
contained civil and political rights, allowing for and framing “the market” 
for goods and services. The (traditional) rights were then supplemented by 
policy goals and a set of rights that were “social” in the Marshallian 
 
 
(addressing social security: “[Social security] represented a stage in human development; its inclusion 
would strengthen the whole document.”). 
 107. U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 89th mtg. at 35 (Sep. 30, 1948). 
 108. Comm’n on Human Rights, 3d Sess., 64th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.64 (June 8, 
1948). 
 109. Comm’n on Human Rights, Draft Declaration on Human Rights, transmitted by letter dated 
Feb. 12, 1946, from the Cuban Delegation to the President of the Economic and Social Council, U.N. 
Doc. E/HR/1 (Apr. 22, 1946) [hereinafter CUBAN DRAFT]. 
 110. U.N. General Assembly, Statement of Essential Human Rights Presented by the Delegation 
of Panama, U.N. Doc. A/148 (Oct. 24, 1946) [hereinafter PANAMANIAN DRAFT]. 
 111. Inter-American Juridical Committee, Draft Declaration of the International Rights and Duties 
of Man, Submitted by the Delegation of Chile, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2 (Jan. 8, 1947) [hereinafter 
CHILEAN DRAFT]. The Chilean proposal was an early draft of the American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man. The declaration was eventually adopted by the Ninth International Conference of 
American States at Bogotá, Colombia, on May 2, 1948, reprinted in 43 AM. J. INT’L L. SUPP. 133 
(1949) and Comm’n on Human Rights, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/122 (June 10, 1948). 
 112. See Mary Ann Glendon, The Forgotten Crucible: The Latin American Influence on the 
Universal Human Rights Idea, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 27 (2003) (tracing the ideational backgrounds 
of the Latin American drafts). 
 113. See Paolo G. Carozza, From Conquest to Constitutions: Retrieving a Latin American 
Tradition of the Idea of Human Rights, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 281 (2003) (arguing that the Latin American 
human rights movement of the early twentieth century had its own genuine outlook drawing on 
humanism, foreign labor legislation, and Catholic social doctrines, the importance of French and 
United States models notwithstanding). 
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sense.
114
 Some examples may illustrate these pioneering constitutional 
“goals” and “rights.” 
A number of Latin American constitutions explicitly promised to the 
people the continuous betterment of their living conditions, a goal—later 
epitomized in the concept of development
115—envisioning collective 
welfare, to be realized through increasing levels of production or 
employment or the advancement of infrastructure. Under the heading 
“Social Guarantees,” the 1871 Constitution of Costa Rica (as amended in 
1944), for instance, promised in article 51: “The state will work for the 
greatest well-being of Costa-Ricans, protecting in a special way the 
family, the basis of the Nation; . . . organizing and stimulating production 
and the most adequate distribution of wealth.”116 The 1945 Constitution of 
Guatemala opened the chapter on “Individual and Social Guarantees” by 
declaring in article 22: “It is a function of the State to conserve and 
improve the general conditions of the nation, to procure the well-being of 
its inhabitants and to increase wealth by means of the creation and 
encouragement of institutions of credit and social welfare.”117 These 
articles testify to (an assumed) state responsibility with respect to the 
“social welfare” of all residents or to “social justice,” notions that later 
reoccurred in the 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development.
118
 
The early twentieth century Latin American constitutions also 
enshrined individualized rights that were, in U.N. parlance, economic and 
social rights.
119
 The 1940 Constitution of Cuba,
120
 for instance, included a 
 
 
 114. On the notion of social citizenship see supra Part II.A.  
 115. “Development” became a human rights law issue only in the late 1970s, not earlier. See the 
first reference to a “right to development” in the Commission on Human Rights during a debate on the 
question of the realization of the economic, social, and cultural rights contained in the UDHR and the 
ICESCR, in Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. on its 33d Session, Feb. 7–Mar. 11, 1977, 11, U.N. Doc. 
E/5927 (1977). 
 116. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1871, art. 51, translated in AMOS J. PEASLEE, I 
CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS: THE FIRST COMPILATION IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE OF THE TEXTS OF 
THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE VARIOUS NATIONS OF THE WORLD, TOGETHER WITH SUMMARIES, 
ANNOTATIONS, BIBLIOGRAPHIES, AND COMPARATIVE TABLES 503, 507 (1950). 
 117. CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE GUATEMALA DE 1945, art. 22, translated in AMOS J. 
PEASLEE, II CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS: THE FIRST COMPILATION IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE OF 
THE TEXTS OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE VARIOUS NATIONS OF THE WORLD, TOGETHER WITH 
SUMMARIES, ANNOTATIONS, BIBLIOGRAPHIES, AND COMPARATIVE TABLES 71, 74 (1950). 
 118. See Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, art. 2(3), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986) (declaring that states have the right and duty to formulate policies that 
“aim at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals”). 
 119. Latin American constitutions of that time often “constitutionalized” principles or standards 
that had, at that time, already been enacted through an extensive body of (non-constitutional) 
legislation promoted by the International Labor Organization (ILO). See A. Tixier, The Development 
of Social Insurance in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, 32 INT’L LAB. REV. 610, 751 (1935); 
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“title” on “labour and property.” Article 60 of the Cuban Constitution 
read: “Labour is an inalienable right of the individual.”121 Article 61 
promised a minimum wage, stating: “Every . . . worker . . . shall be 
guaranteed a minimum wage or salary.”122 Article 66 proscribed that a 
“maximum day’s work cannot exceed eight hours.”123 And Article 65 of 
the Cuban Constitution stated: “Social security is established as . . . [a] 
right of workers . . . in order to protect [them] . . . against disability, old 
age, unemployment, and other contingencies of labour.”124 The 1886 
Constitution of Colombia (as amended in 1945) even promised some kind 
of social assistance for the destitute, declaring in its section on “Civil 
Rights and Social Guarantees” in article 19: “Public aid is a function of the 
state. It must be given to those who, lacking the means of subsistence and 
the right to demand it of other persons, are physically unable to work.”125 
All these constitutional rights envision individuals as rights holders; the 
rights were introduced in the course of the Latin American revolutions of 
the early twentieth century, aimed at pacifying the rural poor and the urban 
working class (the rights promise more equality); and the rights are not 
strictly dependent on the holders’ participation in the workforce. 
The Latin American drafts tabled at the U.N. level in the mid-1940s 
mirrored these constitutional provisions and the ongoing regional debates 
on the draft Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, eventually 
adopted by the Organization of American States in Bogotá on May 2, 
1948.
126
 Cuba, Panama, and Chile proposed to proclaim a right to work 
and a right to social security. The proclamation was to be accompanied by 
a list of state duties. The Chilean draft, for instance, first stated in 
article XVI: “Every person has the right to social security.”127 The second 
sentence of the draft article specified what states were supposed to do, 
stating: 
The state has the duty to assist all persons to attain social security. 
To this end the state must promote measures of public health and 
 
 
D.H. Blelloch, Latin America and the International Labour Standards, 43 INT’L LAB. REV. 377 
(1941). 
 120. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA DE 1940, translated in PEASLEE, supra 
note 116, at 526. 
 121. Id. at 537. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 538. 
 124. Id. 
 125. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA DE 1886, translated in PEASLEE, 
supra note 116, at 469, 471. 
 126. Ninth Int’l Conference of American States, supra note 111. 
 127. CHILEAN DRAFT, supra note 111, at 9. 
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safety and must establish systems of social insurance and agencies 
of social cooperation in accordance with which all persons may be 
assured an adequate standard of living and may be protected against 
the contingencies of unemployment, accident, disability and ill-
health and the eventuality of old age.
128
 
Cuba and Panama moreover wanted the International Bill of Rights to 
include references to adequate food and living conditions, particularly with 
regard to housing. The list of human rights proposed by Cuba thus included 
the “right to adequate food,” the “right to hygienic living conditions and to 
clothing suitable for the climate,” and the “right to live in surroundings free 
from avoidable diseases.”129 Panama suggested including an article on 
“food and housing,” stating, first, that “[e]very one has the right to 
adequate food and housing” and, second, that it is the state’s “duty to take 
such measures as may be necessary to [e]nsure that all its residents have an 
opportunity to obtain these essentials.”130 The Panamanian delegation left 
no doubt that this right had developmental implications. A comment 
attached to the draft referred to a U.N. Conference on Food and Nutrition 
recommending that states accept their obligation vis-à-vis “their respective 
peoples and to one another to raise levels of nutrition and standards of 
living to improve the efficiency of agricultural production and 
distribution.”131 
Next in line to submit drafts for the International Bill of Rights was the 
United States, represented by Eleanor Roosevelt, who was also chairing 
the Commission on Human Rights. Four important U.S. drafts were filed 
between January and November 1947.
132
 The U.S. drafts of 1947 were the 
first to explicitly use the term “social rights.”133 But the U.S. drafts were 
 
 
 128. Id. 
 129. CUBAN DRAFT, supra note 109, at 4. 
 130. PANAMANIAN DRAFT, supra note 110, at 11–12. 
 131. Id. at 12. 
 132. Comm’n on Human Rights, United States Proposals Regarding an International Bill of 
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/4 (Jan. 28, 1947) [hereinafter January 1947 U.S. Draft]; Comm’n on Human 
Rights, United States Proposals Regarding an International Bill of Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/17 (Feb. 
6, 1947); Drafting Committee on an International Bill of Rights, United States Suggestions for 
Redrafts of Certain Articles in the Draft Outline E/CN.4/AC.1/3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/8 (June 11, 
1947); Comm’n on Human Rights, Proposal for a Declaration of Human Rights Submitted by the 
Representative of the United States on the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/36 (Nov. 
26, 1947). 
 133. The January 1947 U.S. Draft suggested considering four categories of rights for their 
insertion into an international declaration of rights, namely “personal rights” (freedom of speech, 
religion, and property), “procedural rights” (safeguards for persons accused of a crime), “social rights” 
(right to employment and social security, right to enjoy minimum standards of economic, social, and 
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still very different from the Latin American ones. Eleanor Roosevelt was 
prepared to admit that “[m]en in need were not free men.”134 Yet, she also 
insisted that the declaration be confined to enunciating rights and not try 
“to define the methods by which Governments were to ensure the 
realization of those rights,” as the methods would necessarily vary from 
country to country.
135
 U.S. drafts consistently kept to brief statements, 
stressing individual liberties rather than detailed state duties. The June 
1947 draft, already a compromise text, proposed in article 38 the following 
wording for a “right to economic security”: 
Everyone has a right to a decent standard of living; to a fair and 
equal opportunity to earn a livelihood; to wages and hours and 
conditions of work calculated to [e]nsure a just share of the benefits 
of progress to all; and to protection against loss of income on 
account of disability, unemployment, or old age. It is the duty of the 
State to undertake measures that will promote full employment and 
good working conditions; provide protection for wage-earners and 
dependents against lack of income beyond their control; and assure 
adequate food, housing, and community services necessary to the 
well-being of the people.
136
 
To some extent, the wording of the June 1947 draft took up the 
developmental approach of the Latin American countries. The draft talked 
broadly about the “well-being of the people,” it referred to some 
identifiable rights with respect to labor and to protection against loss of 
income, and mentioned state duties. Still, the U.S. draft lacked any 
specification persistently attached to the Latin American drafts, such as a 
reference to a minimum wage, to trade unions, or to social insurance.  
The European countries sided firmly with the United States. Some of 
the Europeans were even more skeptical than the United States. The 
representative of the United Kingdom time and again argued that “freedom 
from want” fell into the competence of specialized U.N. organs, such as 
the International Labour Organization (ILO) or the Food and Agriculture 
 
 
cultural well-being), and “political rights” (right to citizenship and right of citizens to participate in 
their government). January 1947 U.S. Draft, supra note 132, at 2. Mary Ann Glendon attributes the 
insertion in the United States drafts of social rights mainly to the initiative of Eleanor Roosevelt. 
GLENDON, supra note 103, at 43, 45. 
 134. Comm’n on Human Rights, 3d Sess., 64th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.64 (June 8, 
1948). 
 135. Id. 
 136. June 1947 U.S. Draft, supra note 132, at 6–7. 
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Organization of the United Nations (FAO),
137
 or that economic and social 
rights were best served through the granting of civil and political rights, 
primarily the freedom of speech and the right to association.
138
 Even René 
Cassin, representing France and charged with mediating compromises 
among the delegates, believed that economic and social rights were, by 
their very nature, more difficult to define than classical rights,
139
 and that 
states would not agree on specifics.
140
 In May 1948, India and the United 
Kingdom launched the shortest of all drafts concerning economic and 
social rights.
141
 The draft suggested replacing three lengthy articles on the 
right to receive adequate pay, the right to favorable working conditions, 
the right to join trade unions, the right to the preservation of health 
through the highest standard of food, clothing, housing, and medical care, 
and the right to social security with one single article simply stating: 
“Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for health and 
well-being, including security in the event of unemployment, disability, 
old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.”142 
Contrary to popular belief, the Eastern European countries were not the 
ones who made sure that economic and social rights were included into the 
UDHR. The Eastern European countries, led by the Soviet Union, 
abstained from the debates on the UDHR (starting in the Spring of 1946) 
for more than two years. In 1946 and 1947, the representatives of the 
Soviet Union had to confess time and again that they were unable to state 
any opinions.
143
 The Soviet delegates were obviously left without 
instructions from Moscow. In 1947, Eastern European delegates were even 
openly hostile to the idea of establishing rights on the international level. 
In the summer of 1947, Vladimir Koretsky provided a “personal 
impression” that the International Bill of Rights must not create an 
international social system where international government does not 
exist,
144
 a barely concealed admission of the fear that international human 
 
 
 137. Comm'n on Human Rights, 1st Sess., 8th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.8 (Jan. 31, 1947) 
(Charles Dukes, United Kingdom). 
 138. Comm’n on Human Rights, 2d Sess., 42d mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.42 (Dec. 16, 
1947) (Lord Dukeston, United Kingdom). 
 139. Comm’n on Human Rights, 3d Sess., 48th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.48 (May 26, 
1948). 
 140. Drafting Committee on an International Bill of Rights, 1st Sess., 5th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.5 (June 12 1947). 
 141. Comm’n on Human Rights, 3d Sess., India and the United Kingdom: Proposed Amendments 
to the Draft Declaration on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/99 (May, 24, 1948). 
 142. Id. at 6. 
 143. See, e.g., Drafting Committee on an International Bill of Rights, 1st Sess., 2d mtg. at 5, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.2 (June 11, 1947). 
 144. Id. 
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rights might be used as a pretext to intervene in what the Soviet Union 
considered its domestic affairs.
145
 When the Eastern European countries 
fully stepped into the human rights debate in the third session of the 
Commission on Human Rights (during the summer of 1948), they rejected 
the assumption underlying many drafts that the individual and the state 
were somehow at odds. Under socialist doctrine, governments were 
supposed to serve the individuals’ needs, not to threaten their existence.146 
Eastern European countries were also scornful about the idea that 
implementing measures, especially measures relating to economic and 
social rights, could be left to the discretion of states. Eastern European 
representatives fought fiercely to get economic and social rights more 
elaborated. With regard to the right of work, they pressed for a clear 
statement that the state was responsible for the prevention and the 
elimination of unemployment
147
 and for explicitly listing measures 
ensuring that unemployment would vanish.
148
 Some of the statements of 
the Eastern European delegates seemed to imply that states should and 
could effectively resume control over the means of national production. 
With regard to the right to social security, Eastern European delegates 
pushed for a clause explicitly mentioning social insurance as the preferred 
measure of protection and a statement that social insurance was to be 
organized at the expenses of the state and employers only.
149
 
Asian and Arab states did not develop a common, coherent position 
and, hence, did not form one single block. The group comprised six 
countries, namely Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, China, India, and the Philippines. 
The delegates of these countries had a voice and, at certain points, even an 
important one. Charles Malik (representing Lebanon), for instance, served 
as the Commission’s rapporteur. But the influence of these delegates was 
 
 
 145. See also the more outspoken statements of some Eastern European delegates in Comm’n on 
Human Rights, 2d Sess., 38th mtg. at 8 (Alexander Bogomolov, USSR), 10 (Vladislav Ribnikar, 
Yugoslavia), 15 (Michael Klekovkin, Ukrainian SSR), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.38 (Dec. 15, 1947). 
 146. See, e.g., Comm’n on Human Rights, 3d Sess., 51st mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.51 (May 
28, 1948) (“In a modern democracy, the State was not a power imposed on society by force. It was a 
product of the society which had given it birth.” (Alexei Pavlov, USSR)). 
 147. See, e.g., the remarks of Michael Klekovkin in Comm’n on Human Rights, 3d Sess., 64th 
mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.64 (June 8, 1948): “Unemployment had become an every-day 
phenomenon . . . . [He] could not understand that some members opposed the mention of the State as 
responsible for the prevention of unemployment.” 
 148. See, e.g., the statement of Alexei Pavlov in Comm’n on Human Rights, 3d Sess., 49th mtg. at 
9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.49 (May 27, 1948): “Instead of merely making a general statement about the 
right to work, the relevant article should list measures to be taken to ensure that right.” 
 149. See, e.g., the draft put forward by the representative of the USSR in Comm’n on Human 
Rights, 3d Sess., 71st mtg. at 4-5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.71 (June 14, 1948). 
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primarily due to their impressive personalities,
150
 not to group strategy. 
Peng Chun Chang (of China) favored the idea of human dignity and 
education. Hansa Mehta (of India), a Gandhian activist, was interested in 
questions of equality and discrimination. Charles Malik kept stressing the 
sanctity of the individual vis-à-vis a powerful state. In the conflict between 
Western liberalism and Eastern socialism, all of them declined to join the 
ranks of the Eastern European countries, as did the Latin American 
countries. When the drafting of economic and social rights was on the 
Commission’s agenda, Asian and Arab countries tended to support the 
position of the Latin American states. That support proved particularly 
important in the summer of 1948 during the third session of the 
Commission on Human Rights. In June 1948, strong Latin American 
advocates for the inclusion of these rights were absent from the 
Commission’s debates. The debates were dominated by Eastern European 
delegates and their statements praising the achievements of socialism.
151
 In 
that crucial phase, China, Egypt, Lebanon, and the Philippines 
successfully defended some of the Latin American ideas, such as the idea 
that the article on the right to work should to some extent specify duties 
incumbent on the state or societal groups (employers),
152
 or the idea that 
the right to food and housing should be mentioned in the human rights 
catalog.
153
 When doing so, the Asian and Arab delegates faced objections 
raised by the United States and its allies (who disliked the idea of 
references to state responsibilities) and by the Eastern European delegates 
(who wanted to strengthen the role of the state even more).
154
 
Eventually, the economic and social rights proclaimed in the UDHR 
were a compromise based on the firm position of the Latin American 
delegates and the equally firm position of the United States, with 
supporting or moderating contributions by European, Asian, and Arab 
delegates. 
 
 
 150. See the detailed accounts in GLENDON, supra note 103. 
 151. See, e.g., the statements in United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human 
Rights, 3d Sess., Summary Record of the Sixty-Fourth Meeting, 8 (Michael Klekovkin, Ukrainian 
SSR), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.64 (June 8, 1948), and United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n 
on Human Rights, 3d Sess., Summary Record of the Sixty-Sixth Meeting, 14 (Alexei Pavlov, USSR), 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.66 (June 9, 1948). 
 152. See, e.g., the debates on the right to work in United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n 
on Human Rights, 3d Sess., Summary Records of the Sixty-Fourth Meeting and the Sixty-Fifth 
Meeting, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.64-65 (June 8–9, 1948). 
 153. For the debates on the right to food and housing see United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, 
Comm’n on Human Rights, 3d Sess., Summary Record of the Seventy-First Meeting, 2–3, 13–14, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.71 (June 14, 1948). 
 154. See, e.g., the debates on the right to work in Comm’n on Human Rights, 3d Sess., 64th and 
65th mtg., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.64-65 (June 8–9, 1948). 
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C. Economic and Social Rights: The Making of the ICESCR 
Debates on the ICESCR differed from the debates on the UDHR on 
two accounts. For one, the Commission on Human Rights invited 
specialized agencies to participate in the discussions—in particular, the 
ILO, the FAO, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), and the World Health Organization.
155
 The 
specialized agencies gained a significant influence on the final wording of 
some rights, such as the right to social security. Additionally, the delegates 
to the Commission on Human Rights formed new coalitions. The United 
States kept fighting attempts to specify state duties. The Europeans were 
once again its closest allies. The Eastern European countries continued 
moving for inserting clauses specifying state duties. But this time, Latin 
American, Asian, and Arab delegates often joined the Eastern European 
countries. Australia emerged as a new player, especially with respect to 
social security. The following examples are meant to underpin these 
points. 
The first example relates to the right to work. In April 1952, the Soviet 
Union tabled an amendment explicitly stating that the right to work 
“should be guaranteed by the State, with the object of creating conditions 
precluding the threat of death from hunger or inanition.”156 The United 
States and France objected instantaneously. Eleanor Roosevelt asserted 
that state intervention was not the first option; the right to work might 
better be served by “calling for private action rather than State 
intervention, since in many countries labour was not under absolute State 
control as in the USSR.”157 Cassin feared that an “absolute undertaking” 
with regard to the right to work by states might imply a right for the states 
to force people to work.
158
 Chile and Uruguay supported the Soviet Union 
approach. Chile submitted an amendment generally requiring states to 
adopt measures to “guarantee concretely” the enjoyment of the right to 
work and the ensuing state obligations.
159
 Uruguay joined Yugoslavia in 
 
 
 155. See Comm’n on Human Rights, 6th Sess., Draft International Covenant on Human Rights, 
Draft Resolution Concerning Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Submitted by Denmark, Egypt, 
France and Lebanon, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/485 (May 10, 1950), and, for amendments and votes, 
Comm’n on Human Rights, 6th Sess., 187th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.187 (May 11, 1950). 
 156. Comm’n on Human Rights, 8th Sess., Draft International Covenants on Human Rights and 
Measures of Implementation, Draft Amendment to Article 20, Submitted by the USSR, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/L.45 (Apr. 25, 1952). 
 157. Comm’n on Human Rights, 8th Sess., 269th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.269 (Apr. 25, 
1952). 
 158. Id. at 4. 
 159. Comm’n on Human Rights, 8th Sess., Draft International Covenants on Human Rights and 
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proposing an amendment similar to the one of the Soviet Union.
160
 Facing 
fierce resistance, the United States yielded to a compromise text, 
submitted jointly with Lebanon,
161
 conceding that the “steps to be taken by 
a State party” shall include policies to “achieve steady economic 
development and full and productive employment safeguarding 
fundamental political and economic freedoms of the individual.”162 That is 
almost the exact wording of the final version of ICESCR Article 6(2) 
pertaining to the right to work. The paragraph bears the imprint of a broad 
coalition against the United States. 
The second example concerns the right to social security. The Soviet 
Union and Australia took the lead in filing drafts relating to that right. In 
1949 and 1950, both countries came forward with proposals. The 1949 
Soviet Union proposal
163
 expressly mentioned “social insurance,” stressing 
that “[s]ocial security and social insurance for workers and employees 
shall be effected at the expense of the State or at the expense of the 
employers in accordance with the laws of each country.”164 The 1949 
Australian draft
165
 abstained from referring to “social insurance” and 
financial responsibilities, yet briefly circumscribed the content of “social 
security” as encompassing “medical care” and “safeguards against the 
absence of livelihood caused by unemployment, illness or disability, old 
age, or other reasons beyond . . . control.”166 Also, the draft did not only 
address workers or employees. The wording of the 1950 Australian 
proposal was even more elaborate, reading: 
Everyone shall have the right to social security which shall be 
guaranteed by the provision of social benefits, either in cash or in 
kind, assuring to every person at least the means of subsistence and, 
when necessary, adequate treatment in any common contingency 
 
 
Measures of Implementation, Draft Amendment to Article 20, Submitted by Chile, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/L.53 (Apr. 25, 1952). 
 160. Comm’n on Human Rights, 8th Sess., Draft International Covenants on Human Rights and 
Measures of Implementation, Revised Amendment to Article 20, Submitted by Uruguay and 
Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.58/Rev.1 (May 2, 1952). 
 161. Comm’n on Human Rights, 8th Sess., Draft International Covenants on Human Rights and 
Measures of Implementation, Lebanon and United States of America: Joint Amendment to the 
Amendment Submitted by Chile to Article 20 (E/CN.4/L.53), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.93 (May 5, 1952). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. on its 5th Sess., May 9–June 20, 1949, at 48, U.N. Doc. 
E/1371 (June 23, 1949). 
 164. Id. The 1950 USSR proposal was identical to its 1949 proposal. See Comm’n on Human 
Rights, Report on its 6th Sess., Mar. 27–May 19, 1950, at 27, U.N. Doc. E/1681 (May 29, 1950). 
 165. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. on its 5th Sess., supra note 163, at 50. 
 166. Id. 
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occasioning the involuntary loss of income or its insufficiency to 
meet family necessities. The State may prescribe that all or any of 
such benefits may be provided under a general contributory 
system.
167
  
Consensus on the Soviet Union drafts proved impossible to reach. The 
drafts were supported by other Eastern European countries only.
168
 The 
Australian draft was skillfully defended by the Australian delegate, who 
kept stressing the vices of laissez-faire policies and the need to counteract 
increasing social inequalities.
169
 In the end, the Australian draft was 
discarded because the specialized agencies, particularly the ILO, cautioned 
against giving too many details; giving details might in effect weaken the 
right to social security.
170
 After some deliberation, the majority of the 
delegates to the Commission on Human Rights agreed that fleshing out the 
content of “social security” was basically to remain the business of the 
ILO. That is why ICESCR Article 9 contains but one brief sentence: “The 
States Parties . . . recognize the right of everyone to social security, 
including social insurance.”171  
The third example involves ICESCR Article 11, i.e., the right to an 
adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing, and 
housing. Article 11 is reminiscent of the Latin American drafts of 1946.
172
 
The article is, nonetheless, based on a draft filed not by Latin American 
countries, but by the United States.
173
 The early, steady, and conciliatory 
involvement of the United States secured a broad cross-country consensus 
on article 11, whatever the intentions of the United States’ delegates may 
 
 
 167. Comm’n on Human Rights, Report on its 6th Sess., supra note 164, at 26. 
 168. For an account on the discussions see Comm’n on Human Rights, 6th Sess., 184th mtg., U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/SR.184 (May 9, 1950); Comm’n on Human Rights, 6th Sess., 185th mtg., U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/SR.185 (May 10, 1950); Comm’n on Human Rights, 6th Sess., 186th mtg., U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/SR.186 (May 11, 1950); Comm’n on Human Rights, 7th Sess., 220th mtg., U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/SR.220 (Apr. 30, 1951); and Comm’n on Human Rights, 7th Sess., 221st mtg., U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/SR.221 (May 1, 1951). 
 169. See, e.g., the statement of H.F.E. Whitlam of Australia, in Comm’n on Human Rights, 6th 
Sess., 184th mtg., supra note 168, at 4. 
 170. See, e.g., the statement of Wilfred Jenks, ILO, in Comm’n on Human Rights, 7th Sess., 221st 
mtg., supra note 168, at 9–11. 
 171. ICESCR, supra note 14, art. 9. 
 172. See supra Part II.B. 
 173. In April 1951, the United States proposed to insert into the draft covenant an additional 
article stating, inter alia: “Each State party to this Covenant undertakes, with due regard to its 
organization and resources, to promote conditions of economic, social and cultural progress and 
development for securing . . . b) improved standards of living.” Comm’n on Human Rights Working 
Group on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 7th Sess., Compilation of Proposals Relating to 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights at 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.14/2/Add.3 (Apr. 27, 1951). 
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have been when they first submitted the draft in April 1951. The April 
1951 draft of the United States apparently responded to the proposals on 
economic and social rights put forward by the Soviet Union and 
Australia,
174
 suggesting instead a text simply highlighting a number of 
policy goals formulated as state “undertakings,” thought to be dependent 
on the organization of the state and the resources available. According to 
the April 1951 U.S. draft, the primary state undertaking was to relate to 
“economic, social and cultural progress and development,”175 secondary 
undertakings were meant to relate to a number of sub-goals, such as the 
“opportunity for all freely to engage in occupations,”176 “just and 
favourable conditions of work,”177 “measures of social security for all in 
need of such protection,”178 and “improved standards of living and 
health.”179 The United States draft triggered immediate criticisms, 
especially from Chile and Egypt, for avoiding language referring explicitly 
to “rights.” Vaguely talking about “progress and development” was, the 
Egyptian delegate argued, very different from defining rights.
180
 The 
delegates to the Commission agreed, though, that economic and social 
rights necessarily involved state duties, and that these duties needed to be 
addressed and, to some extent, specified. Once the delegates to the 
Commission had decided to combine the language of economic and social 
rights with a language of state duties,
181
 they proceeded to dealing with the 
various drafts relating to the right to social security, to special provisions 
concerning women and children, to the right to living accommodation, 
and, eventually, the right to an adequate standard of living, a right that was 
at that time only backed by the April 1951 United States draft and an 
 
 
 174. See supra notes 163, 165, 167. 
 175. Comm’n on Human Rights Working Group on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 7th 
Sess., Compilation of Proposals Relating to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/AC.14/2 (Apr. 27, 1951). 
 176. Id. at 3. 
 177. Comm’n on Human Rights, Working Group on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 7th 
Sess., Compilation of Proposals Relating to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/AC.14/2/Add.2 (Apr. 27, 1951). 
 178. Comm’n on Human Rights, Working Group on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 7th 
Sess., Compilation of Proposals Relating to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/AC.14/2/Add.3 (Apr. 27, 1951). 
 179. Id. at 5. 
 180. Statement of Mahmoud Azmi Bey, Egypt, in Comm’n on Human Rights Working Group on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 7th Sess., 1st mtg. at 23, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.14/SR.1 (Apr. 
26, 1951). 
 181. See, in particular, the various statements of the delegates to the Commission on Human 
Rights in Comm’n on Human Rights, 7th Sess., 216th mtg., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.216 (Apr. 27, 
1951). 
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Australian draft that differed slightly in wording.
182
 The Australian 
proposal was eventually adopted by fourteen votes to none (with four 
abstentions).
183
 Unanimity of the votes was extremely rare. 
D. International Social Citizenship? 
The debates in the Commission on Human Rights demonstrate that the 
genesis of U.N.-sponsored economic and social rights is anything but 
clear-cut or unequivocal. First, all articles of the UDHR and the ICESCR 
are couched in the language of rights. Still, the articles primarily imply 
duties, notably of the state, at least in the last resort. References to duties 
became quite inevitable when the members of the Commission on Human 
Rights moved to elaborate on what was meant by the economic and social 
“rights” proclaimed in the UDHR. Many of the specifications of the 
ICESCR expressly resort to a language of duties.
184
 Secondly, economic 
and social rights were meant to cover a wide range of state strategies 
aimed at the realization of the rights and duties. From the perspective of 
the lawmakers, the undertakings incumbent on states may, yet need not, 
exclusively relate to individualized citizenship rights in a Marshallian 
sense. In fact, U.N.-sponsored economic and social rights draw on three 
major ideologies, and two of them have no place for “social citizenship.” 
Economic and social rights have developmental roots rehearsing Latin 
American constitutions of the early twentieth century. Latin American 
constitutions made it a general responsibility for the state to progressively 
advance the living conditions of the people in their territories.
185
 
Individualized economic and social rights were supposed to evolve 
alongside modernization and economic growth. The post-war rights have 
roots in liberalism. The United States stood for a strict version of 
liberalism. At times, Eleanor Roosevelt contended that human rights law 
was also about securing freedom from want.
186
 More often, however, she 
engaged in rejecting attempts to elaborate further what states ought to do 
 
 
 182. The Australian proposal read: “Each State party to this Covenant recognises that everyone 
has the right . . . to an adequate standard of living.” Comm’n on Human Rights, Working Group, 
Compilation of Proposals, supra note 173. 
 183. See Comm’n on Human Rights, 7th Sess., 223d mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.223 (May 2, 
1951). Draft article 24 of the Covenant then read: “The States Parties to the Covenant recognize the 
right of everyone to an adequate standard of living and the continuous improvement of living 
conditions.” Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. on its 7th Sess., April 16–May 19, 1951, at 23, U.N. 
Doc. E/1992 (May 24, 1951). 
 184. See ICESCR, supra note 14, arts. 2–3, 6(2), 8, 10–11. 
 185. See supra Part II.B. and text accompanying note 115. 
 186. See supra Part II.B. and text accompanying note 134. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss2/5
  
 
 
 
 
2014] HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP 233 
 
 
 
 
when implementing that freedom. Latin American states (and some others, 
such as Australia) preferred a milder version of liberalism. These delegates 
pressed for provisions (e.g., on social security) that gave some details, 
even if that meant proscribing state intervention in market forces.
187
 And 
the post-war rights have roots in socialism. When the Eastern European 
countries joined the drafting effort in the summer of 1948, they too 
insisted on making state duties more concrete.
188
 But, unlike the Latin 
Americans, their proposals often resounded socialist thinking. This made it 
difficult for others to follow suit, and most of the proposals were rejected. 
Only one of these strands possibly implied a notion of “social 
citizenship,” based on individual rights, a distinct understanding of 
equality, and the aim of bypassing the market, i.e., the core of Marshall’s 
concept.
189
 Developmental and socialist approaches fail at least on one 
account. Developmental policies primarily envisage the betterment of all 
inhabitants, i.e., collective welfare; they are not specifically addressed to 
“weaker” sections of the population. Socialist policies proceeded from the 
assumption that the plague of social inequality belonged to the past. Social 
benefits responded to merit, work, sacrifice, or the legitimate inability to 
fulfill the expectations of society due to sickness or disability; rights and 
duties were tightly connected.
190
 Liberal approaches acknowledged that 
market-based modernization generates risks that threaten segments of the 
population, especially the labor force.
191
 Liberal approaches acknowledged 
that traditional individual rights need, to some extent, to be supplemented, 
since civil and political rights alone would not suffice to render protection, 
for example in the case of unemployment.
192
 Economic and social rights 
inspired by liberalism also bypass the market-forces; they do so, however, 
in a specific manner. From the point of view of liberalism, economic and 
social rights are not meant to guarantee everyone some kind of basic 
income free of conditions. If the rights promise individualized benefits in 
cash or in kind, they promise benefits that are either targeted, requiring the 
 
 
 187. See supra Part II.C and text accompanying note 167. 
 188. See supra Part II.B and text accompanying note 147. 
 189. See supra Part II.A. 
 190. Eastern European delegates constantly stressed that individual rights and duties were to be 
construed as reciprocal. See, e.g., the statement of Valentin Tepliakov in Comm’n on Human Rights, 
1st Sess., 14th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.14 (Feb. 4, 1947): “There could be no right to work 
without a corresponding duty to the community. . . . He asked that the Bill include the individual’s 
obligation to work for the community, by which he meant his country as well as the United Nations.” 
 191. See supra Part II.C and text accompanying note 169. 
 192. See, e.g., the statement of Ronald Lebeau (Belgium) in United Nations, Econ. & Soc. 
Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, 1st Sess., Summary Record of the Ninth Meeting, 4-5, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/SR.9 (Feb. 1, 1947). 
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lack of self-help or of the help of others, or depend on one’s own 
contributions. 
In short, U.N.-sponsored economic and social rights were not intended 
to exclusively provide an international layer for state-accorded social 
citizenship rights. Social citizenship is certainly one way for the states to 
fulfill their undertakings under the ICESCR. But states parties may choose 
other effective strategies. Social rights combine and allow for many 
readings, according to ideational background and context. The right to 
work (ICESCR article 6), for instance, obliges states to enact laws 
protecting the workers from excessive powers of the employer (and that 
most certainly implies the granting of individual rights vis-à-vis the 
employer), but article 6 also obliges states to resort to adequate 
employment policies (not necessarily involving individual rights).
193
 Also, 
the extent to which states intervene in the labor market or even the 
institutional framework of the labor market itself may vary from country 
to country (e.g., the role of trade unions or the role of the state with respect 
to fixing minima for wages). Finally, to give another example, ICESCR 
Article 9 (the right to social security) is obviously prone to granting 
individual rights (how else could access to social benefits in cash be 
organized?).
194
 ICESCR Article 11, however, seems to primarily address 
policies aiming at collective welfare. And states are free to relate social 
rights to individual duties as they think fit (as long as the duties do not 
collide with other human rights). 
III. STATES TALK UNDER THE ICESCR:  
SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP GOING GLOBAL 
The meaning of human rights guarantees is not fixed once and for all 
by what their lawmakers had in mind. On the contrary, human rights are 
meant to be “living instruments,” as the European Court of Human Rights 
frequently puts it.
195
 The content of human rights is concretized and 
constantly negotiated anew by way of implementation and review, actions 
necessarily involving the interpretation of human rights clauses. 
International law on treaties acknowledges these processes. Under the 
relevant rules, interpreters must first explore the ordinary meaning of the 
 
 
 193. See ICESCR, supra note 14, art. 6(2). 
 194. For the notion of “social security” and the individualization of benefits see, e.g., ILO 
Convention No. 102 on Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, June 28, 1952, at 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_INSTRUMEN
T_ID:312247:NO. 
 195. See, e.g., Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1, 15–16 ¶ 31 (1978). 
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terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of the treaty’s object 
and purpose, paying attention to the travaux préparatoires (VCLT Articles 
31 and 32).
196
 In addition to textual interpretation, subsequent agreements 
between the states parties or subsequent practice in the application of the 
treaty shall also be taken into account.
197
 Subsequent practice certainly 
includes official enunciations of the human rights bodies established by 
the treaties; these bodies are specifically commissioned to watch over the 
implementation of the rights laid down in the treaties and to state their 
opinions.
198
 Yet the major players in international law are still the states 
parties, and their reading of human rights law, though more difficult to 
collect on a global basis, also contributes to subsequent state practice. 
From the focus of this Article—states reconstructing U.N.-sponsored 
economic and social rights in global arenas—the state party reports 
submitted under the framework of the ICESCR seem particularly 
pertinent, as these reports provide insights into how states read and re-read 
these rights. Additionally, if widespread and translated into action, the 
states’ reading may feed back into the meaning of the rights recognized 
under the Covenant.
199
 Accordingly, this Article now turns to states 
reporting under the ICESCR. How do states talk about economic and 
social rights and the measures they employ to realize the rights? Did the 
idea of “social citizenship” gain more adherents over the last decades or, 
in other words, did “social citizenship” go global? 
A. The Setting: Human Rights Machinery Under the ICESCR 
The ICESCR sets up a distinct framework for member states to talk 
about the implementation of the rights recognized in the Covenant.
200
 
 
 
 196. According to article 32 of the Convention, recourse to the preparatory work and the 
circumstances of its conclusion may in particular be had when—as is the case for U.N.-sponsored 
human rights law—the interpretation under article 31 leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure. 
VCLT, supra note 18, arts. 31–32. 
 197. Id. art. 31(3)(a)–(b). 
 198. See also Kerstin Mechlem, Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights, 42 VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 905 (2009) (making a convincing case for the view that human rights treaty bodies 
play an important role in establishing the normative content of human rights). 
 199. VCLT, supra note 18, art. 31(3)(b). 
 200. For details on the reporting procedure under the ICESCR that constantly evolved over time, 
see Philip Alston & Bruno Simma, First Session of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 747 (1987); Philip Alston & Bruno Simma, Second Session of the 
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 603 (1988); Scott Leckie, 
An Overview and Appraisal of the Fifth Session of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, 13 HUM. RTS. Q. 545 (1991); Philip Alston, The Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 473 (Philip 
Alston ed., 1992); Matthew Craven, Towards an Unofficial Petition Procedure: A Review on the Role 
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States parties are obliged to regularly report in writing to a panel of 
reviewers (ICESCR Articles 16 and 17). The states parties are then invited 
to orally present their report. State representatives face questions by the 
reviewing panel, and the panel may request additional information. Each 
reporting round concludes with observations by the panel, evaluating the 
report and the human rights situation prevailing in the country 
concerned.
201
 From 1978 through 1985, the panel was composed of state 
delegates.
202
 Since 1986, the panel—now called the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural rights (the “Committee”)—is composed of 
eighteen independent experts with competence in human rights.
203
 For 
more than a decade, states parties were requested to submit their reports in 
three biennial stages; the first stage was supposed to cover the rights laid 
down in ICESCR Articles 6 to 9, the second stage the rights laid down in 
ICESCR Articles 10 to 12, and the third stage the rights laid down in 
ICESCR Articles 13 to 15.
204
 In May 1988, the ECOSOC introduced a 
new reporting program.
205
 Henceforth, states parties were requested to 
submit, at five-year intervals, one single report covering all three principle 
groups of rights plus the provisions contained in ICESCR Articles 1 to 5. 
Reporting under the ICESCR is certainly an exercise in rhetoric by 
states confronting an international human rights body empowered to assess 
their performance under the Covenant. Reporting is nonetheless more than 
that. The state party reports reveal whether the authors are willing to 
comply with their reporting obligations, whether they accept the language 
of human rights and corresponding duties, whether they speak freely about 
 
 
of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in SOCIAL RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS: 
A EUROPEAN CHALLENGE 91 (Krzysztof Drzewicki, Catarina Krause & Allan Rosas eds., 1994). 
 201. For an overview on the working methods of the Committee established under the ICESCR 
see Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Report of the Fourth Session (15 January–2 
February 1990), 6–11, U.N. Doc. E/1990/23 (1990), and, recently, United Nations, Econ. & Soc. 
Council, Committee on Social and Cultural Rights, Report of the Forty-Second and Forty-Third 
Sessions, 4–22 May 2009, 2–20 Nov. 2009, ¶¶ 26–66, U.N. Doc. E/2010/22 (2010). 
 202. E.S.C. Res. 1988 (LX), U.N. Doc. E/5850 (May 11, 1976) (on procedures for the 
implementation of the ICESCR); E.S.C. Dec. 1978/10, in Resolutions and Decisions of the Econ. & 
Soc. Council 1978 at 34, U.N. Doc. E/1978/78 (1978), (on the composition of the sessional working 
group on the implementation of the ICESCR). 
 203. E.S.C. Res. 1985/17, supra note 75, on the review of the composition, organization and 
administrative arrangements of the Sessional Working Group of Governmental Experts on the 
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The activities 
of the Committee can be traced through its sessional reports, from its seventh session, in 1992, until 
the present, via U.N. Dag Hammarskjöld Library, United Nations Bibliographic Information System 
(UNBISNET), http://www.unbisnet.un.org. 
 204. E.S.C. Res. 1988 (LX), supra note 202. 
 205. E.S.C. Res. 1988/4 (on the ICESCR), in Resolutions and Decisions of the Econ. & Soc. 
Council, Org. Session for 1988 & 1st Sess. Of 1988 at 8, U.N. Doc. E/1988/88 (1988). 
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their difficulties or believe that their human rights record is flawless, 
whether they appropriate the concepts propagated by the Committee or 
other global human rights bodies, and what they believe to be adequate 
measures for implementing the rights under the ICESCR. As a whole, 
these regular exercises in self-description and reflection may well advance 
the gradual internalization of human rights values in countries across the 
globe.
206
 
B. The Sample: State Party Reports from 1977 to 2011 
The following analysis builds on a newly created database (the 
ICESCR-SPR 2011, revised in 2012) encompassing data drawn from the 
reports under the ICESCR from the beginning of 1977, when the first state 
party reports were submitted following the entry into force of the 
Covenant in January 1976, through the end of 2011.
207
 The reports 
predating 1993 have been photocopied and scanned; post-1993 reports 
have been retrieved via the “Treaty Body Database,” a database 
maintained by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights.
208
 As of December 31, 2011, the ICESCR-SPR included 
data drawn from 546 reports submitted under the ICESCR.
209
 The reports 
were authored by 124 states parties; four no longer exist (Czechoslovakia, 
German Democratic Republic, People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, 
 
 
 206. On the concept of “internalization” see, e.g., Koh, supra note 64; Harold Hongju Koh, The 
1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623 (1998); Harold 
Hongju Koh, Internalization Through Socialization, 54 DUKE L.J. 975 (2004). 
 207. I created the ICESCR-SPR 2011 database in the context of FLOOR, a research group headed 
by Benjamin Davy, Lutz Leisering, and me. See Principal Investigators, FLOOR, http://www.floor 
group.raumplanung.tu-dortmund.de/joomla/index.php/team/principal-investigators (last visited Oct. 4, 
2013). The ICESCR-SPR 2011 database draws on a comprehensive questionnaire I have developed 
and expanded since 2008 and data collected by Luise Buschmann, Nina-Claire Himpe, and myself in 
2011 and 2012. Based on the variables listed in the questionnaire, we coded the state party reports on 
paper. The data extracted from the reports were then imported into a spreadsheet. I updated and 
revised the raw data in 2012. I am grateful to Lutz Leisering, Petra Buhr, and Susann Kunadt for 
valuable inputs on how to conceptualize a questionnaire, to Anne Casprig for introducing Nina-Claire 
Himpe to the world of epidata, and to Nina-Claire Himpe for translating the paper-data into 
spreadsheet-data. Christiane Hastaedt was the most reliable administrator of the primary data. I could 
not have done without her! My gratitude also extends to Tina Fahr, Hacer Bolat, Jens Hanschmidt, 
Aylin Alexandra von Radziewski, Gülsah Seyfeli, and Charlotte Strauch for their inputs along the way. 
 208. The database is accessible through the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(UNHCHR) website. All Reports by Convention, UNHCHR, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/Rep 
Statfrset?OpenFrameSet (last visited Jan. 1, 2012). 
 209. A report covering (only) one (or more) of the “stages” described in E.S.C. Res. 1988 (LX), 
supra note 202, has been counted as one report. The number 546, hence, includes single reports 
covering all the provisions of the ICESCR and reports relating to arts. 6–9, to arts. 10–12, or to arts. 
13–15 only. A list of all reports included in the analysis is on file with author. 
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and Yugoslavia). One report was submitted by a U.N. administrative 
mission.
210
 Four states parties extended their reports to various dependent 
territories (totaling 119 reports).
211
 China reported separately on Hong 
Kong and Macao (three reports). From the perspective of regional 
representation, developed Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries, countries from Europe and Central Asia, 
Arab States, and countries from Latin America and the Caribbean score 
high.
212
 Twenty-seven out of twenty-eight developed OECD countries 
participated in the reporting mechanism under the ICESCR.
213
 
Participation also extends to twenty-two out of twenty-three countries 
from Europe and Central Asia,
214
 twelve out of seventeen Arab States,
215
 
and twenty-two out of thirty-two countries from Latin America and the 
Caribbean.
216
 
The break-down of the reports submitted from 1977 through 2011 
reveals that the sample is, to some extent, unbalanced. For one, reports 
authored by developed OECD or developed non-OECD countries make up 
more than 30% of the sample, reports from Latin American or Caribbean 
countries reach almost 15%, and reports from countries in Europe or 
Central Asia make up 11%. Reports from other regional groupings are 
underrepresented. The regional breakdown of the reports relating to 
metropolitan territories is as follows:  
 
 
 210. Upon request of the Committee established under the ICESCR, the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), acting under the authority of S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999), filed a report with respect to the Kosovo in October 2007. Econ. & Soc. 
Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Document Submitted by UNMIK Under Articles 16 and 17 
of the Covenant, Kosovo (Serbia), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/UNK/1 (Oct. 16, 2007). 
 211. The Netherlands reported on the Antilles and Aruba (seven reports), New Zealand on Niue 
and Tokelau (four reports), Portugal on Macao (one report), and the United Kingdom on Antigua, 
Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Brunei, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Falkland Islands, 
Gibraltar, Gilbert Islands, Montserrat, Pitcairn, Solomon Islands, St. Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla, St. 
Helena, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Turks and Caicos Islands, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, and Hong 
Kong (107 reports). 
 212. This Article follows the country groupings suggested by the UNITED NATIONS 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010 236–37 (2010), available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/270/hdr_2010_en_complete_reprint.pdf.  
 213. The United States of America has signed, but not ratified, the ICESCR. U.N. Secretary-
General, supra note 78. 
 214. Montenegro became a state party to the ICESCR on October 23, 2006. A state party report 
has been submitted on December 23, 2011. The report was not available as of Dec. 31, 2011. See All 
Reports by Convention, supra note 208. 
 215. Reports have been submitted by Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Morocco, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, and Yemen. Id. 
 216. The countries filing reports under the ICESCR include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela. Id. 
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TABLE 1: STATE PARTY REPORTS RELATING TO METROPOLITAN 
TERRITORIES 
AUTHORS BY COUNTRY GROUPINGS REPORTS PERCENT 
Developed OECD 146 26.7 
Developed non-OECD 22 4 
Latin America and Caribbean 80 14.7 
Europe and Central Asia 60 11 
Sub-Saharan Africa 35 6.4 
Arab States 32 5.9 
East Asia and the Pacific 19 3.5 
South Asia 14 2.6 
Countries that no longer exist 17 3.1 
Country replacement (UNMIK) 1 0.18 
 426  
Source: ICESCR-SPR 2011, revised 2012 
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Additionally, reports filed with respect to dependent territories or a 
special administrative region (such as Macao) reach 22% (120 reports). 
Finally, the number of reports authored by countries that, at the time of 
submission, considered themselves “socialist” or had a socialist past is 
considerable. In the former case, the number of reports reaches 85 (16% of 
all reports); in the latter case, the number reaches 67 (12% of all reports). 
If one decided to set the total number of reports at 426 (in disregard of the 
reports filed with respect to dependent territories or a special 
administrative region), the significance of reports authored by socialist or 
post-socialist states is, of course, even higher. The overall total then is 
36%. 
C. Economic and Social Rights: The Reading of the States Parties 
For decades, economic and social rights laid down by human rights law 
have been met with skepticism by Western scholars. Often, the rights have 
been called weak and distinct from civil and political rights. Some pointed 
out that the pertinent provisions merely pronounced lofty goals without 
creating obligations for states.
217
 Under ICESCR Article 2(3), so they 
argued, states were expressly empowered to realize the rights 
progressively, according to available resources; that would make the 
“rights” clearly distinguishable from the rights set forth in the ICCPR.218 
The obligations deriving from ICESCR “rights” appeared to be “sharply” 
limited.
219
 Others stressed that the realization of economic and social 
rights required the availability of financial resources, and occasionally 
even a massive reallocation of resources.
220
 In general, states would not be 
able or not be willing to commit themselves to doing so; hence, social 
rights pertained to “the twilight world of utopian aspiration.”221 And still 
others emphasized that “positive” state obligations were inherently non-
 
 
 217. See, e.g., Robert Starr, International Protection of Human Rights and the United Nations 
Covenants, 1967 WIS. L. REV. 863; Richard L. Siegel, Socioeconomic Human Rights: Past and 
Future, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 255 (1985). 
 218. Starr, supra note 217, at 868–69. 
 219. Siegel, supra note 217, at 257. 
 220. See, e.g., Maurice Cranston, Human Rights, Real and Supposed, in TALKING ABOUT 
WELFARE: READINGS IN PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL POLICY 133 (Noel Timms & David Watson eds., 
1976) (contending that, for a government to provide social security, it had to have access to great 
capital wealth, and many governments in the world were still poor); Seymour J. Rubin, Economic and 
Social Human Rights and the New International Economic Order, 1 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 67 
(1986) (arguing that economic and social rights were of no practical value; progress was achieved 
through the work of specialized agencies, such as the ILO or the FAO, rather than through human 
rights bodies). 
 221. Cranston, supra note 220, at 142. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss2/5
  
 
 
 
 
2014] HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP 241 
 
 
 
 
justiciable and, therefore, unenforceable.
222
 The proper allocation of 
resources and the adequate distribution of wealth were to remain the 
genuine realm of politics; courts were not supposed to meddle.  
An analysis of the ICESCR state party reports filed from 1977 through 
2011 casts doubt at least on certain aspects of these master narratives.
223
 
The data suggest that states increasingly commit to ICESCR rights and 
that states indeed engage in shaping what has, for the purposes of this 
Article, been termed “social citizenship.”224 To argue these points in detail, 
this Article now focuses on the right to social security
225
 and the right to 
an adequate standard of living.
226
 These rights belong to the core of the 
social rights of the ICESCR. 
1. States Commit to Economic and Social Rights 
Four indicators signal that the states parties to the ICESCR are 
prepared to formally and rhetorically accept the commitments deriving 
from the Covenant. 
First, the number of ratifications by states (160) is impressive, even if 
some states have, so far, abstained from joining the states parties. In the 
three decades following the first ratification in 1968, the number of new 
ratifiers was forty-five, forty-five, and forty-nine, respectively.
227
 Since 
1997, the numbers have declined significantly.
228
 The last ratifiers joined 
in 2008.
229
 After 2008, ratifications came to a halt.
230
 Developed countries 
numbered high in the first and second wave (1968 to 1987), countries from 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia in the first and the third wave (1968 to 
1978 and 1988 to 1997); countries from Sub-Saharan Africa participated 
significantly in each wave. Countries from East Asia and the Pacific were 
underrepresented in each of the three waves. Still, the important point here 
is that most states of the world have been willing to ratify the ICESCR, the 
existence of non-ratifiers notwithstanding.
231
  
 
 
 222. E.W. Vierdag, supra note 73, at 83–94. 
 223. For a sociological perspective on the legal narratives, see Anthony Woodiwiss, supra note 
60. 
 224. See supra Part II.A. 
 225. ICESCR, supra note 14, art. 9. 
 226. ICESCR, supra note 14, art. 11. 
  227. The first wave of ratifications (1968 to 1977) included forty-five countries, the second wave 
(1978 to 1987) included another set of forty-five countries, the third wave (1988 to 1997) comprised 
forty-nine countries. ICESCR-SPR 2011, revised 2012. 
 228. The fourth wave of ratifications (1998 to 2007) extended to twenty-one ratifiers. Id. 
 229. Last in line were the Bahamas, Papua New Guinea, and Pakistan. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Among the East Asian non-ratifiers are Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Myanmar, and 
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Secondly, the popular assumption that article 2(3) of the ICESCR—
obliging states to achieve the realization of the rights “progressively”—
weakened the states’ undertakings, allowing them to openly opt out of 
their duties, is not confirmed by the data drawn from the state party 
reports. In fact, in their reports to the Committee, states parties rarely rely 
on the escape clause of ICESCR Article 2(3). From 1977 to 2011, only 10 
of 546 reports (less than 2%) somehow mentioned the clause. The 2001 
Benin report contended that, given the prevailing economic difficulties in 
the country, the government had taken measures in order to 
“progressively, and to the extent of its capacities, to achieve” the goal of 
safeguarding the rights enshrined in the ICESCR.
232
 The 2009 report of 
Ethiopia held that certain (domestic) constitutional guarantees are 
“believed to ensure the progressive realization of the rights incorporated in 
the Covenant.”233 The 2006 report of Kenya noted, even more acutely, that 
a draft constitution “provided for progressive realization of rights in line 
with available resources.”234 The 2007 report of the Republic of Korea 
expressly admitted that Korea had “not yet complied with the 
requirements laid down in the Covenant.”235 But the report quickly added 
that Korea was nonetheless “committed to doing its best to improve 
economic, social and cultural rights to the extent that available resources 
permit.”236 A similar reasoning can be found in the 1983 report of 
Mexico,
237
 the 1993 report of Morocco,
238
 the 1994 report of El 
 
 
Singapore. Botswana, Mozambique, and South Africa are the major African non-ratifiers. Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are among the major Arab non-ratifiers. Cuba and 
Haiti are missing from the list of Latin American ratifiers. And the United States of America is the 
only developed country that did not ratify the ICESCR. ICESCR-SPR 2011, revised 2012. 
 232. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Initial Reports Submitted by States 
Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, Addendum: Benin, Feb. 5, 2001, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. 
E/1990/5/Add.48 (Sept. 5, 2001). 
 233. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Implementation of the ICESCR, Combined Initial, 
Second and Third Periodic Reports, Ethiopia, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/ETH/1-3 (July 28, 2009). 
 234. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Initial Reports Submitted by States 
Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, Kenya, ¶ 27, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/KEN/1 (Sept. 7, 
2006). 
 235. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Third Periodic Reports Submitted by 
States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, Republic of Korea, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/KOR/3 (June 27, 2007). 
 236. Id. 
 237. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Initial Reports Submitted by States 
Parties to the Covenant Concerning Rights Covered by Articles 6 to 9, in Accordance with the First 
Stage of the Programme Established by the Econ. & Soc. Council in its Resolution 1988 (LX), 
Addendum: Mexico, ¶ 147, U.N. Doc. E/1984/6/Add.10 (Nov. 25, 1983). 
 238. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Initial Reports Submitted by States 
Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, Addendum: Morocco, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. 
E/1990/5/Add.13 (Mar. 16, 1993). 
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Salvador,
239
 the 1995 report of Zimbabwe,
240
 and the 2001 and 2009 
reports of the government of the still non-self-governing territory of 
Tokelau (formally submitted by New Zealand).
241
 Where these reports 
admit to non-compliance, the authors are keen to stress that they want to 
fare better and improve their records. Apart from this handful of reports, 
the escape clause of ICESCR Article 2(3) is a non-issue. 
Third, the commitment of the states parties to the ICESCR does seem 
weak from a procedural perspective. Forty out of the 160 member states 
have so far abstained from filing reports altogether, among them 24 Sub-
Saharan African states.
242
 On average, almost all reports are delayed by 
forty-two months. The number of months is lower for countries classified 
as developed OECD countries or European and Central Asian countries 
(thirty months) and considerably higher for Sub-Saharan African countries 
or countries in South Asia (eighty months). Very often, the substantial 
parts of the reports are evasive, inconclusive, or lack data. The first report 
of Costa Rica, for instance, simply contained a list of legal provisions 
without any comments.
243
 The first report of Iceland quoted—under the 
heading of ICESCR Article 9 (right to social security)—from an 
incomprehensible earlier report filed with the ILO.
244
 The first Jordanian 
report merely asserted that a social security scheme had been incorporated 
in the Labour Act applying to all workers over sixteen years of age, yet 
 
 
 239. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Initial Reports Submitted by States 
Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, Addendum: El Salvador, ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. 
E/1990/5/Add.25 (Dec. 16, 1994). 
 240. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Initial Reports Submitted by States 
Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, Addendum: Zimbabwe, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. 
E/1990/5/Add.28 (June 30, 1995). 
 241. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Second Periodic Reports Submitted 
by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, Addendum: New Zealand, ¶ 721, U.N. 
Doc. E/1990/6/Add.33 (Sept. 30, 2001), and Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, 
Third Periodic Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, New 
Zealand, ¶ 772, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/NZL/3 (Apr. 4, 2009). 
 242. The group of the Sub-Saharan African states refraining from reporting includes Burkina 
Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, 
Niger, the Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Togo, and Uganda. ICESCR-SPR 2011, revised 2012. 
On the implementation of the ICESCR rights in Africa generally, see J. Oloka-Onyango, Beyond the 
Rhetoric: Reinvigorating the Struggle for Economic and Social Rights in Africa, 26 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 
1 (1995) (making the case that implementation differs between the “North” and the “South” of Africa 
and that, in either case, implementation remains poor). 
 243. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Initial Reports Submitted by States 
Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, Addendum: Costa Rica, U.N. Doc. E/1990/5/Add.3 
(Mar. 1, 1989). 
 244. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Initial Reports Submitted by States 
Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, Addendum: Iceland, ¶¶ 143–44, U.N. Doc. 
E/1990/5/Add.6 (May 25, 1991). 
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said nothing about benefits.
245
 Luxembourg, whose fourth report has been 
due since June 2008, basically submitted the same short report in 1988, 
1995, and 2001.
246
 However, the willingness of the member states to 
report comprehensively has improved considerably over time. From 1977 
through 1986 (the first decade of reporting), the state party reports reached 
27 pages on average (n = 225 reports).
247
 From 2000 through 2009 (the 
last decade of reporting), the average number of pages was 118 (n = 144 
reports). Presently, reports provide more and more robust information. 
States also started to speak freely about failures with respect to 
compliance. Sometimes, their criticism is levelled at previous 
governments. The 1995 report of Guyana, for example, claimed that the 
structural adjustment program adopted by the former government had 
“been fraught with many contradictions and difficulties,”248 a situation that 
had allegedly been aggravated further by corruption, mismanagement, 
extravagance, and the lack of democracy.
249
 In order to turn the tide, the 
new government, so the report went on, had moved to reordering priorities 
and “directing more resources to the critical areas of health, education and 
housing.”250 Sometimes, state party reports are self-critical. The 2005 
report of Hungary, for instance, conceded that the current measures 
tailored to combat poverty had, so far, missed out on their goals.
251
 The 
Hungarian report concluded: “Because of the large number of 
beneficiaries . . . , cash transfers [providing social assistance] are of an 
inadequate amount when they are most needed.”252 The remedy announced 
in the report was to tie the level of benefits “much more carefully . . . to 
 
 
 245. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Initial Reports Submitted by States 
Parties to the Covenant, in Accordance with Council Resoultion 1988 (LX), Concerning Rights 
Covered by Articles 6–9, Jordan, at 6, U.N. Doc. E/1984/6/Add.15 (Oct. 1, 1986). 
 246. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Initial Reports Submitted by States 
Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, Addendum: Luxembourg, U.N. Doc. 
E/1990/5/Add.1 (May 22, 1989); Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Second 
Periodic Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, Addendum: 
Luxembourg, U.N. Doc. E/1990/6/Add.9 (Nov. 29, 1995); Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of 
the ICESCR, Third Periodic Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the 
Covenant, Addendum: Luxembourg, U.N. Doc. E/1994/104/Add.24 (July 13, 2001). 
 247. In empirical research, “n” is used to refer to the size of the relevant sample, given in natural 
numbers. In the context of this article, “n” relates to state party reports under the ICESCR. 
 248. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Initial Reports Submitted by States 
Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, Addendum: Guyana, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. 
E/1990/5/Add.27 (June 28, 1995). 
 249. Id. ¶ 2. 
 250. Id. ¶ 3. 
 251. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Third Periodic Reports Submitted by 
States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, Hungary, ¶¶ 352–61, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/HUN/3 (Sept. 28, 2005). 
 252. Id. ¶ 361. 
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need.”253 Recent state party reports certainly contribute substantially to the 
human rights dialogue directed and structured by the ICESCR Committee. 
Fourth, the analysis of the state party reports from 1997 to 2011 
testifies to a remarkable tendency of “appropriation” by the states parties 
to the ICESCR of the human rights concept. Under ICESCR Article 16, 
the states parties undertake to submit to the Committee “reports on the 
measures which they have adopted and the progress made in achieving the 
observance of the rights recognized herein.”254 When filing their reports 
with the Committee, states face three options of how to present their 
domestic policies. For one, states may choose to address international 
human rights law in an introductory remark, where they generally concede 
the fact that, as states parties to the ICESCR, they have recognized 
“rights” deriving from a legal order that is not domestic and that these 
“rights” need to be implemented, realized, ensured, or guaranteed through 
actions on the national level. In that vein, the 2006 report of Benin, for 
example, noted in an “introduction” that the report “describes the 
measures taken and the progress made by the State of Benin to guarantee 
enjoyment of the rights recognized in the Covenant.”255 The report clearly 
speaks of “rights” pertaining to the international legal order (“recognized 
in the Covenant”) and also addresses ensuing state responsibilities 
(“progress made . . . to guarantee”). Additionally, states may choose to 
(also) lean on human rights language when elaborating on the measures 
designed to concretize the rights specified in the ICESCR. The 1977 report 
of the Federal Republic of Germany, for instance, started the section 
concerning ICESCR Article 9 by announcing: “In the Federal Republic of 
Germany the guarantee of the right to social security is based on an 
extensive social system which protects . . . nearly the entire population . . . 
in the event of sickness, maternity, industrial accidents and occupational 
diseases, invalidity, old age and death.”256 The report of the Federal 
Republic of Germany acknowledges the existence of a non-domestic 
“right” in the specific context of ICESCR Article 9 (“guarantee of the right 
to social security”) as well as a state duty to provide for its realization in 
the national arena (“guarantee . . . is based on an extensive social 
 
 
 253. Id. 
 254. ICESCR, supra note 14, art. 16. 
 255. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Second Periodic Reports Submitted 
by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, Benin, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/BEN/2 
(Dec. 19, 2006). 
 256. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Reports Submitted in Accordance 
with Council Resolution 1988 (LX) by States Parties to the Covenant Concerning Rights Covered by 
Articles 6 to 9, Federal Republic of Germany, 22, U.N. Doc. E/1978/8/Add.11 (Feb. 13, 1978). 
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system . . .”).257 Finally, the states parties may choose to ignore the 
international order of human rights and instead focus on national law and, 
as the case may be, on national rights. The 2009 report of Ethiopia
258
 
provides a good example of an exclusively domestic focus. The first 
paragraph under the heading of ICESCR Article 9 reads: 
Provision of social security by government within the limit of 
available resources is one of the social objectives enshrined in the 
Constitution . . . . The Constitution imposes obligation [sic] on the 
State to allocate resources . . . to provide rehabilitation and 
assistance to the physically and mentally disabled, the aged, and to 
children who are left without parents or guardian.
259
 
The Ethiopian report lacks any reference to an international order of 
rights or an international order of state responsibilities requiring measures 
on the national level. Instead, the report solely relies on duties imposed by 
the Constitution. Reports drawing on the first or the second choice take a 
relational view (as they “relate” domestic law or action to international 
human rights law), though only the second choice implies a strong 
relational view, as it seems more difficult to opt for a human rights 
language in a specified context. Reports drawing on the third choice 
abstain from expressly reflecting on the relationship between the human 
rights order and the domestic order. 
The actual choices of the states parties vary along two dimensions: 
time and content. There is a significant trend towards accepting human 
rights language as an “own” language over time, and that trend is different 
for different articles of the ICESCR; in particular, the trend is different for 
ICESCR Articles 9 and 11. Content obviously matters. To pinpoint the 
trends in numbers: Of all the reports submitted in the first decade, from 
1977 to 1986 (n = 99 reports), 34% expressed relational views with respect 
to the “right” under ICESCR Article 9 (right to social security), yet only 
24% of the reports took a strong relational stance. For the reports of the 
last reporting decade (2000 to 2009), percentages are up 50 and 30 
respectively (n = 144 reports). In the context of ICESCR Article 11, scores 
are much higher, even in the early days of the reporting mechanism. Of the 
reports filed from 1977 to 1986 (n = 73 reports), 60% showed relational 
views, 52% even strong relational views. Again, the numbers are up for 
the last reporting decade. Of the 144 reports submitted from 2000 to 2009, 
 
 
 257. Id. 
 258. Combined Initial, Second and Third Periodic Reports, Ethiopia, supra note 233. 
 259. Id. ¶ 116. 
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72% acknowledged the “rights” under ICESCR Article 11 (right to 
adequate standard of living, the right to housing, or the right to food), and 
63% did so strongly, that is, in the immediate context of ICESCR 
Article 11. 
These data invite two conclusions. First, distrustfulness of international 
economic and social rights has—to some extent—given way to a general 
acceptance of these rights and to a willingness of the states parties to join 
the international community of states and its standards. Second, the 
intensity of the willingness depends on what the “rights” imply. Basic 
social rights, such as the right to food or the right to housing (article 11), 
are apparently much easier to accept than the right to social security, 
including social insurance (article 9). 
2. States Engage in Reinterpreting Social Rights 
When the states parties to the ICESCR report to the Committee they 
regularly disclose their social policies and their reading of the rights they 
have recognized when adhering to the Covenant. The analysis of the 
reports from 1977 to 2011 shows that, over time, descriptions of domestic 
social policies became more and more homogenous, and the reading of 
social rights more and more similar. The shift is visible from a comparison 
involving the reports of the first reporting decade (1977 to 1986) on the 
one hand and the reports of the last reporting decade (2000 to 2009) on the 
other. 
The reports submitted in the first reporting decade (1977 to 1986) 
regularly covered only a part of the articles of the ICESCR.
260
 The rights 
laid down in article 9 were (and had to be) dealt with by state party reports 
covering the rights of ICESCR Articles 6 to 9 (first set of rights reports). 
The rights laid down in article 11 were dealt with by reports covering the 
ICESCR rights of Articles 10 to 12 (second set of rights reports). The total 
number of first set of rights reports was ninety-nine; the total number of 
second set of rights reports was seventy-three. The regional breakdown of 
these sets of reports is as follows:   
 
 
 260. On the early rules for submitting state party reports see supra Part III.A. 
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TABLE 2: REPORTS PERTAINING TO ICESCR ARTICLES 9 AND 11,  
1977 TO 1986 
REGIONAL GROUPINGS / DEPENDENT TERRITORIES ARTICLE 9 
REPORTS 
ARTICLE 11 
REPORTS 
Central, Eastern, Southern Europe 22 19 
OECD 21 21 
Latin America and Caribbean 11 5 
East Asia and the Pacific 5 3 
Arab States 4 4 
Sub-Saharan Africa 3 5 
South Asia 2 1 
Dependent Territories 31 15 
 99 73 
Source: ICESCR-SPR 2011, revised 2012 
The reports from 1977 to 1986 covering the rights under ICESCR 
Articles 9 and 11 can easily be grouped according to differing approaches 
and understandings. Socialist states, Latin American states, and OECD 
states were the main contributors. 
Socialist states, particularly those in Eastern and Central Europe, used 
to emphatically welcome the rights secured by the ICESCR. Socialist 
states had no problem with the binding character of economic and social 
rights. However, their enthusiasm had little practical impact. Socialist 
states were convinced that they need not change anything since the rights 
were already fully secured in their territories. Two examples may underpin 
this point. The 1978 report of the Soviet Union starts with the assertion 
that the Soviet Union had ratified the ICESCR already in 1973 and was, 
therefore, “the first of the great Powers to express . . . its willingness to 
assume the obligations set out in the Covenant.”261 The following sentence 
reads: “It should be noted in particular that neither the ratification of the 
Covenant by the Soviet Union nor its entry into force on 3 January 1976 
required any changes in or additions to Soviet legislation.”262 The 
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR) similarly claimed in its 1978 
report that the rights of the ICESCR were, for quite a while, perfectly 
safeguarded: “The rights referred to in Articles 6–9 . . . had been 
 
 
 261. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Reports Submitted in Accordance 
with Council Resolution 1988 (LX) by States Parties to the ICESCR Concerning Rights Covered by 
Articles 6 to 9, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1, U.N. Doc. E/1978/8/Add.16 (Apr. 10, 1978). 
 262. Id. 
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guaranteed in [the CSSR] even before the [ICESCR] entered into force . . . 
These rights are respected and also in practice fully observed.”263 Most of 
the Eastern European countries were, consequently, only weak 
relationalists. That holds true, e.g., for Bulgaria, the CSSR, the German 
Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Romania, and the Soviet Union.
264
 These 
countries spoke of the rights of ICESCR Articles 9 and 11 just briefly in 
their introductory remarks; the remainder of the report was then confined 
to only national law.
265
 
According to socialist states, the implementation of ICESCR Article 11 
required a persistent policy of economic development based on planning 
and agrarian reform, expressed and made known publicly through growing 
numbers of goods produced, dwellings built, and state services 
rendered.
266
 From a socialist perspective, social security under ICESCR 
Article 9 was strictly construed as the flip side of the right and duty to 
work. In its essence, socialism was about uniting workers (and peasants) in 
a common effort to enhance the material basis of society. Under such an 
order, individual security rested primarily on work and the remuneration 
thereby gained. Everyone contributed to economic growth (and was 
expected to do so), and everyone gained personally from the growth of the 
economy (minimum wages, rising wages).
267
 Social security, in turn, 
focused on either contingencies making work impossible (sickness, care 
for other persons, pregnancy, industrial injury, disability, and old age) or 
exceptional individual efforts deemed valuable for the common good 
(bravery in combat or an emergency, multiple motherhood).
268
 In short, 
under socialism individuals received social security benefits because they 
deserved them.
269
 The reports barely referred to people in need, and at 
 
 
 263. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Reports Submitted by States Parties 
Concerning Rights Covered by Articles 6 to 9 of the Covenant Accordance with Council Resolution 
1988 (LX), Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, 1, U.N. Doc. E/1978/8/Add.18 (June 8, 1978). 
 264. Source: ICESCR-SPR 2011, revised 2012. 
 265. See, e.g., United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Initial 
Reports (Articles 10 to 12), German Democratic Republic, 1, U.N. Doc. E/1980/6/Add.6 (Oct. 16, 
1979); United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Initial Reports 
(Articles 10 to 12), Mongolia, 2, U.N. Doc. E/1980/6/Add.7 (Dec. 6, 1979). 
 266. See, e.g., Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Reports Submitted in 
Accordance with Council Resolution 1988 (LX) by States Parties to the Covenant Concerning Rights 
Covered by Articles 10 to 12, Mongolia, 1, U.N. Doc. E/1980/6/Add.7 (Jan. 7, 1980). 
 267. For an overview on the socialist “heritage” see Igor Tomeš, Ten Years of Social Reform in 
Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, in TRANSFORMATION VON SYSTEMEN SOZIALER 
SICHERHEIT IN MITTEL- UND OSTEUROPA. BESTANDSAUFNAHME UND KRITISCHE ANALYSE AUS DEM 
BLICKWINKEL DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 21, 22–27 (Bernd Baron von Maydell & Angelika 
Nußberger, eds., 2000). 
 268. Id. 
 269. The 1985 report of the German Democratic Republic addresses reciprocity of social security 
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times states bluntly denied that such groups existed.
270
 In the early 1980s, 
at least some reports seemed to imply that income security in old age had 
become a problem.
271
 
Latin American states sometimes stressed that they were the first to 
constitutionalize economic and social rights. The 1985 report of Mexico, 
for instance, proudly stated: 
To a large extent, the modern vision of law and the progressive 
character of the [ICESCR] coincide with the principles that emerged 
from the Mexican Revolution, which began in 1910. . . . [Our] 
Political Constitution [of 1917] fully recognized individual rights 
and freedoms, but at the same time, in a broader perspective, it 
embodied social rights, according priority to the collective interest 
over individual or private interests and promoting the enjoyment of 
fundamental rights in the field of social well-being.
272
  
Latin American states did not hesitate to accept that the ICESCR 
entailed rights and obligations based in international law.
273
 Most of the 
reports did so in a strong relational manner. The 1983 report of Chile, for 
instance, started its chapter on article 9 quite unequivocally: “Article 9 of 
the [ICESCR] provides that the States Parties . . . recognize the right of 
everyone to social security, including social insurance. In conformity with 
[that] article, Chile’s Constitution recognizes the right to social security of 
 
 
quite openly: “On the one hand, [social security] rests on socialist society’s concern for the 
development of the individual and on friendly co-operation, aid and mutual support and, on the other 
hand, on the individual’s responsibility for matters of public interest.” Econ. & Soc. Council, 
Implementation of the ICESCR, Second Periodic Reports Submitted by States Parties to the Covenant 
Concerning Rights Covered by Articles 6 to 9 in Accordance with the First Stage of the Programme 
Established by the Econ. & Soc. Council in its Resolution 1988 (LX), Addendum: German Democratic 
Republic, ¶ 75, U.N. Doc. E/1984/7/Add.23 (Sept. 13, 1985). 
 270. See Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Reports Submitted in 
Accordance with Council Resolution 1988 (LX) by States Parties to the Covenant Concerning Rights 
Covered by Articles 10 to 12, Poland, 15, U.N. Doc. E/1980/6/Add.12 (Feb. 21, 1980). 
 271. See, e.g., Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Second Periodic Reports 
Submitted by States Parties to the Covenant Concerning Rights Covered by Articles 6 to 9 in 
Accordance with the First Stage of the Programme Established by the Econ. & Soc. Council in its 
Resolution 1988 (LX), Addendum: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, ¶ 134, U.N. Doc. 
E/1984/7/Add.9 (Mar. 13, 1983). For an overview on the developments with respect to social security 
in the Soviet Union from 1985 through 1991 and the early years after the transition, see Lillian Liu, 
Income Security in Transition for the Aged and Children in the Soviet Union and in the Russian 
Federation, 56 SOC. SEC. BULL. 60, 74 (1993) (discussing state-operated and private programs 
directed at helping growing numbers of people living below subsistence levels). 
 272. Econ. & Soc. Council, supra note 237. 
 273. Six of eleven initial reports covering articles 6 to 9 unmistakably accepted the binding 
character of the rights guaranteed by the ICESCR (Ecuador, Chile, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, and 
Venezuela). ICESCR-SPR 2011, revised 2012. 
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all inhabitants of the Republic without distinction.”274 The first sentence of 
the quotation paraphrases what is written in article 9; the second sentence 
contends that Chile has incorporated a non-domestic right (the right to 
social security under article 9) into domestic law and that, in doing so, 
Chile conformed to an international obligation (“in conformity with” 
ICESCR Article 9). The 1979 report of Jamaica declared: “Provisions are 
made for the realization of rights to social security through national 
insurance and public assistance benefits.”275 The Jamaican report also 
refers to non-domestic rights that need to be “realized” and asserts that that 
realization is effectuated through national enactments (social insurance 
law, social assistance law).
276
  
When presenting their policies under ICESCR Article 11, early Latin 
American reports talked about a policy of economic development, yet this 
policy relied primarily on market forces and private initiatives. The 1985 
report of Venezuela, for example, referred to “the State’s obligation to 
promote economic development and the diversification of production in 
order to create new sources of wealth” and, at the same time, also stressed 
“the parents’ obligation to care for and support their children.”277 With 
respect to housing, the 1979 report of Chile talked about specific policies 
that were compatible with the policies of urban and socio-economic 
development, but also noted: “The State should play a secondary role in 
housing. It is for the private sector to marshal resources and means to meet 
aspirations for housing.”278 With respect to the realization of the right to 
food, Latin American states relied on private farming; state intervention 
remained confined to agrarian land reforms ensuring that workers would 
own the land they worked.
279
 Hence, policies reported under ICESCR 
 
 
 274. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Second Periodic Reports Submitted 
by States Parties to the Covenant Concerning Rights Covered by Articles 6 to 9 in Accordance with 
the First Stage of the Programme Established by the Council in its Resolution 1988 (LX), Chile, 
¶¶ 92–93, U.N. Doc. E/1984/7/Add.1 (Jan. 19, 1984). 
 275. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Reports Concerning Rights Covered 
by Articles 6 to 9 of the Covenant Submitted by States Parties to the Covenant in Accordance with 
Council Resolution 1988 (LX), Jamaica, 25, U.N. Doc. E/1978/8/Add.27 (Oct. 11, 1979). 
 276. Id. at 20, 22.  
 277. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Reports Submitted by States Parties 
to the Covenant Concerning Rights Covered by Articles 10 to 12 in Accordance with the Second Stage 
of the Programme Established by the Econ. & Soc. Council in Resolution 1988 (LX), Venezuela, ¶ 9, 
U.N. Doc. E/1980/6/Add.38 (Nov. 14, 1985). 
 278. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Reports Submitted in Accordance 
with Council Resolution 1988 (LX) by States Parties to the Covenant Concerning Rights Covered by 
Articles 10 to 12, Chile, 6, U.N. Doc. E/1980/6/Add.4 (Dec. 21, 1979). 
 279. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Reports Submitted in Accordance 
with Council Resolution 1988 (LX) by States Parties to the Covenant Concerning Rights Covered by 
Articles 10 to 12, Panama, 9, U.N. Doc. E/1980/6/Add.20 (Oct. 27, 1980). 
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Article 11 basically concentrated on the framing of private activities 
through legislation (family law, planning law, and land reform), the 
provision of low-interest loans, tax incentives for investors, and, as the 
case may be, need-specified cash benefits (housing assistance). Social 
security under article 9 was described as mainly financed through the 
contributions by the employees and the employers and, sometimes, by the 
state. With respect to ICESCR Article 9 as well as 11, early Latin 
American reports tended to be outspoken on shortcomings. Some reports 
conceded openly that vast groups of the rural or urban population 
(especially rural workers and domestic workers) were not covered by their 
regimes of social insurance,
280
 that established social security regimes 
failed to cover certain contingencies, such as unemployment,
281
 or that 
employers and employees failed to pay their contributions. As a 
consequence, employees were left without protection.
282
 Finally, some 
Latin American reports explicitly addressed socioeconomic inequalities, 
especially with regard to rural people. Panama, for instance, talked about 
the establishment of “super-kiosks” in marginal areas, where staple 
foodstuffs were offered to low-income families at moderate prices to 
improve family nutrition.
283
 Nicaragua talked about directing social 
policies towards “the needs of the socially disadvantaged.”284 Colombia 
talked about the introduction of a family allowance program that would 
reach “the lowest-income families.”285 
OECD states (Western European states, Australia, Canada, and Japan) 
make up the third group. These states, in particular the Western European 
states, were reluctant to expressly relate their legal regimes to individual 
rights or state obligations deriving from the ICESCR, particularly in the 
 
 
 280. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Reports Submitted in Accordance 
with Council Resolution 1988 (LX) by States Parties to the Covenant Concerning Rights Covered by 
Articles 6 to 9, Ecuador, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. E/1978/8/Add.1 (Jan. 3, 1978); Economic and Social Council, 
Implementation of the ICESCR, Initial Reports Submitted by States Parties to the Covenant 
Concerning Rights Covered by Articles 6 to 9 in Accordance with the First Stage of the Programme 
Established by the Econ. & Soc. Council in its Resolution 1988 (LX), Venezuela, ¶ 54, U.N. Doc. 
E/1984/6/Add.1 (Feb. 10, 1984). 
 281. Econ. & Soc. Council, supra note 237, at ¶ 147. 
 282. Econ. & Soc. Council, supra note 275, at 26. 
 283. Econ. & Soc. Council, supra note 279, at 13. 
 284. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Initial Reports Submitted by States 
Parties to the Covenant Concerning Rights Covered by Articles 6 to 9 in Accordance with the First 
Stage of the Programme Established by the Econ. & Soc. Council Resolution 1988 (LX), Addendum: 
Nicaragua, 22, U.N. Doc. E/1984/6/Add.9 (Apr. 1, 1985). 
 285. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Second Periodic Reports Submitted 
by States Parties to the Covenant Concerning Rights Covered by Articles 6 to 9 in Accordance with 
the First Stage of the Programme Established by the Econ. & Soc. Council in its Resolution 1988 
(LX), Addendum: Colombia, ¶ 206, U.N. Doc. E/1984/7/Add.21/Rev.1 (Feb. 26, 1986). 
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context of article 9. Only five out of twenty-one reports expressly adopted 
the international right to social security into their language.
286
 The states 
rather chose to describe their domestic orders under the heading of the 
Covenant’s article, without commenting on the relation between their legal 
regimes and the rights under the Covenant.
287
 The 1977 report of the 
United Kingdom, for instance, started the section on article 9 (right to 
social security) by saying: “The legislation listed in the United Kingdom 
Art. 22 reports on ILO. Convention 102 relates to the following fields: 
Medical Care, Cash Sickness Benefit, Old Age Benefits, Survivors’ 
Benefits, Unemployment Benefits, Family Benefits.”288 The report then 
went on describing these various fields in greater detail, without any 
reference to the ICESCR. Denmark proceeded similarly in the 1977 
report,
289
 and so did Finland in the 1978 report.
290
 The 1979 report of the 
Federal Republic of Germany opened the section on article 11 (right to an 
adequate standard of living) by stating: “This objective is realized above 
all in the field covered by articles 6 and 9 . . . . Persons who are capable of 
working should . . . be given the opportunity . . . . Social security benefits 
are to be granted to persons who are not capable of working.”291 The 
German report cautiously spoke of an “objective,” not of a “right,” when 
addressing the content of article 11.  
The reports of the OECD states never expressly mentioned 
“development” as a policy goal. Under the heading of ICESCR article 11, 
the states instead talked of “economic policy” and “social policy.”292 
Unemployment and the prevention or mitigation of unemployment had 
their full attention. Food and housing was to be organized through the 
 
 
 286. Source: ICESCR-SPR 2011, revised 2012. 
 287. The situation is different in the context of ICESCR Article 11. Of the twenty-one reports 
submitted by OECD states, fifteen opted for a strong relational language and six abstained from doing 
so. Source: ICESCR-SPR 2011, revised 2012. 
 288. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Reports Submitted by States Parties 
Concerning Rights Covered by Articles 6 to 9 of the Covenant in Accordance with Council Resolution 
1988 (LX), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 75, U.N. Doc. E/1978/8/Add.9 
(Jan. 19, 1977). 
 289. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Reports Submitted in Accordance 
with Council Resolution 1988 (LX) by States Parties to the Covenant Concerning Rights Covered by 
Articles 6 to 9, Denmark, 5, U.N. Doc. E/1978/8/Add.13 (Feb. 13, 1978). 
 290. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Reports Submitted in Accordance 
with Council Resolution 1988 (LX) by States Parties to the Covenant Concerning Rights Covered by 
Articles 6 to 9, Finland, 9, U.N. Doc. E/1978/8/Add.14 (Mar. 13, 1978). 
 291. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Reports Submitted in Accordance 
with Council Resolution 1988 (LX) by States Parties to the Covenant Concerning Rights Covered by 
Articles 10 to 12, Federal Republic of Germany, 19, U.N. Doc. E/1980/6/Add.10 (Feb. 4, 1980). 
 292. See, e.g., United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Initial 
Reports (Article 10 to 12), Austria, 17, U.N. Doc. E/1980/6/Add.19 (July 31, 1980). 
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market, and income from employment was certainly key to having access 
to these markets. As a last resort, the adequate standard of living—access 
to food, housing, and clothing—was to be secured through state-financed 
cash benefits (social assistance). In that vein, the 1983 report of the 
Netherlands started the section on ICESCR Article 11 by declaring: “The 
right to an adequate standard of living is guaranteed for every citizen of 
the Netherlands by the National Assistance Act . . . which laid down new 
provisions on government assistance to meet the cost of subsistence.”293 
When detailing their measures under ICESCR Article 9, OECD states 
mainly elaborated on their regimes of social insurance, often with some 
brief references to social assistance as the last safety net. The 1983 report 
of Denmark, for instance, had a lengthy chapter on the Danish pension 
policy; in the context, the report also mentioned state-financed “personal 
allowances” for pensioners “whose situation is particularly difficult.”294 
The 1984 report of Finland, to take another example, concluded a 
paragraph on unemployment benefits remarking that, if the unemployed 
would no longer qualify for the insurance benefit, it was “for the social 
welfare authorities to secure his livelihood.”295 
Around 1993, state discussions under the heading of the (social) rights 
laid down in ICESCR Articles 9 and 11 gained unprecedented momentum. 
The new dynamic paralleled with changes in national and global politics. 
One center of events was Eastern Europe. Eastern European states 
experienced the demise of socialism. Another center of events was, again, 
Latin America. Latin American states became disillusioned with the 
structural readjustment programs the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund had been favoring for more than a decade. As early as 
1988, a Mexican state party report reasoned gloomily: “Notwithstanding 
the progress achieved, problems subsist; some have not been solved by 
economic growth, others have been caused by the process of development 
 
 
 293. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Reports Submitted in Accordance 
with Council Resolution 1988 (LX) by States Parties to the Covenant Concerning Rights Covered by 
Articles 10 to 12, Netherlands, ¶ 49, U.N. Doc. E/1980/6/Add.33 (Nov. 8, 1983). 
 294. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Second Periodic Reports Submitted 
by States Parties to the Covenant Concerning Rights Covered by Articles 6 to 9 in Accordance with 
the First Stage of the Programme Established by the Econ. & Soc. Council in its Resolution 1988 
(LX), Denmark, ¶ 164, U.N. Doc. E/1984/7/Add.11 (Feb. 3, 1983). 
 295. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Second Periodic Reports Submitted 
by States Parties to the Covenant Concerning Rights Covered by Articles 6 to 9 in Accordance with 
the First Stage of the Programme Established by the Econ. & Soc. Council Resolution 1988 (LX), 
Finland, ¶ 40, U.N. Doc. E/1984/7/Add.14 (Feb. 14, 1984). 
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itself.”296 The 1988 report of Jamaica was more to the point, although still 
clinging to the continuation of the adjustment program.
297
 The Jamaican 
report asserted that, despite “progress,” the “overall economic framework” 
would still be “fragile,” as the balance of payments remained vulnerable, 
the real interest rates high, and the external debt large.
298
 The 1988 
Jamaican report also asserted that “there has been a deterioration in the 
social infrastructure and the provision of a variety of social services.”299 
Commenting on the structural adjustment programs imposed in the 1980s 
in order to strengthen macroeconomic stability, the 2006 Costa Rican 
report lamented in retrospect: “[T]he weak link over [the decade of the 
1980s] has been Costa Rica’s sustainable human development. There has 
been growth, but it has been volatile and erratic in origin.”300 As a 
consequence, so the Costa Rican report contended, the country had 
suffered “a drop in social investment especially in health and education, 
and a significant rise in poverty, which affected almost 50% of Costa 
Rican households.”301 
In late 1990, in a development which might have added to the new 
momentum, the Committee under the ICESCR issued revised guidelines 
on how to structure state party reports.
302
 The guidelines adopted by the 
Committee at its fifth session held in November and December of 1990 
specifically required reporting states to “supply information on the current 
standard of living” of their populations, in particular in respect of 
“different socio-economic, cultural, and other groups.”303 States parties of 
the ICESCR were, moreover, asked to “indicate the per capita GNP for the 
poorest 40 per cent” of their population and provide information on the 
“poverty line” established in their countries and on the situation of 
 
 
 296. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Initial Reports Submitted by States 
Parties to the Covenant Concerning Rights Covered by Articles 10 to 12 in Accordance with the 
Second Stage of the Programme Established by the Econ. & Soc. Council in its Resolution 1988 (LX), 
Mexico, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/1986/3/Add.13 (Dec. 9, 1988). 
 297. Economic and Social Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Second Reports Submitted by 
States Parties to the Covenant Concerning Rights Covered by Articles 6 to 9 in Accordance with the 
First Stage of the Programme Established by the Econ. & Soc. Council in its Resolution 1988 (LX), 
Addendum: Jamaica, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. E/1984/7/Add.30 (Aug. 23, 1988). 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Fourth Periodic Reports Submitted 
by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, Costa Rica, ¶ 71, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/CRI/4 
(June 22, 2006). 
 301. Id. ¶ 21. 
 302. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Revised General Guidelines Regarding the Form 
and Contents of Reports to be Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the ICESCR, 
Annex, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1991/1 (June 17, 1991). 
 303. Id. art. 11(1)(a). 
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“especially vulnerable or disadvantaged groups.”304 These suggestions 
suited well with the interest in poverty announced by the World Bank in 
1990
305
 and, later, with the debates on the link between poverty and human 
rights initiated by the World Bank,
306
 the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP),
307
 the U.N. Commission on Human Rights,
308
 and 
the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
309
 
Against that backdrop, state party reports under the ICESCR changed 
dramatically in focus and tone. Until the mid-1990s, states parties barely 
touched upon issues of socioeconomic inequality, rare exceptions apart, 
such as Tanzania, India, Iraq, Rwanda, and Colombia.
310
 Around 1980, 
 
 
 304. Id. art. 11(1)(c), 2(b). 
 305. See EHTISHAM AHMAD ET AL., WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1990 
(focusing on poverty), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContent 
Server/IW3P/IB/2013/02/28/000425962_20130228141712/Rendered/PDF/PUB85070REPLACEMEN
T0WDR01990.pdf. 
 306. See ANTHONY GAETA ET AL., WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE 
ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK (1998). 
 307. See UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997, 
available at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/258/hdr_1997_en_complete_nostats.pdf; 
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000, available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/261/hdr_2000_en.pdf. 
 308. In 1998, the Commission on Human Rights appointed the first special rapporteur on human 
rights and extreme poverty. A.-M. Lizin submitted her first report in 1999, suggesting, inter alia, that 
all states provide for “a guaranteed minimum income” and thus facilitate access to essential social 
services, such as social and medical welfare, food, housing, employment, training, schooling, 
education and culture. Comm’n on Human Rights, Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights: Human Rights and 
Extreme Poverty, Rep. Submitted by Ms. A.-M. Lizin, Independent Expert Pursuant to Commission 
Resolution 1998/25, 33, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/48 (Jan. 29, 1999). 
 309. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, DRAFT GUIDELINES: A HUMAN 
RIGHTS APPROACH TO POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGIES (2002), available at http://www.refworld 
.org/docid/3f8298544.html. For a recent take, see Hum. Rts. Council, Final Draft of the Guiding 
Principles on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Submitted by the Special Rapporteur on Extreme 
Poverty and Human Rights, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/3 (2012). 
 310. See, e.g., Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Reports Submitted in 
Accordance with Council Resolution 1988 (LX) by States Parties to the Covenant Concerning Rights 
Covered by Articles 10 to 12, United Republic of Tanzania, 3, U.N. Doc. E/1980/6/Add.2 (Dec. 21, 
1979) (succinctly claiming that the country was now set for a struggle against ignorance, poverty and 
diseases). The 1983 report of India gave a list of government efforts with a view to improving the 
standards of living of all people in the country and then went on, saying, “[i]t has been estimated that 
nearly 48 per cent of the population live below the poverty level and are in no position to afford 
adequate quantities of food. The elimination of poverty, therefore, finds the highest priority in the 
Government’s development plans.” Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Reports 
Submitted in Accordance with Council Resolution 1988 (LX) by States Parties to the Covenant, 
Concerning Rights Covered by Articles 10 to 12, India, ¶ 47, U.N. Doc. E/1980/6/Add.34 (Nov. 15, 
1983). See also Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Reports Submitted in 
Accordance with Council Resolution 1988 (LX) by States Parties to the Covenant Concerning Rights 
Covered by Articles 10 to 12, Iraq, 5, 19-20, U.N. Doc. E/1980/6/Add.14 (Jan. 27, 1981); Econ. & 
Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Initial Reports Submitted by States Parties to the 
Covenant Concerning Rights Covered by Articles 10 to 12, in Accordance with the Second Stage of 
the Programme Established by the Economic and Social Council in its Resolution 1988 (LX), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss2/5
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Eastern European countries and other socialist countries had firmly 
believed in the steady progress “of all their people” induced by socialism; 
they saw no need to rank and compare people according to wealth or 
income.
311
 OECD countries preferred to speak of people in need of state 
support, of people without the necessary means of sustenance, or of people 
who were unable to support themselves.
312
 People in need were meant to 
receive state-financed support in cash or in kind (social assistance), and 
their numbers appeared to be marginal. Early in the 1990s, the states 
parties to the ICESCR started to talk increasingly about “poverty,” a 
phenomenon they conceived of as a problem that needed attention. Mexico 
and Nicaragua made the start.
313
 The two countries were, in 1994, joined 
by Portugal, Sweden, the Philippines, and Paraguay.
314
 Many others 
followed suit. The rise of poverty as a global issue again coincided with 
 
 
Addendum: Rwanda, ¶ 52, U.N. Doc. E/1986/3/Add.1 (Jan. 28, 1986); Econ. & Soc. Council, 
Implementation of the ICESCR, Second Periodic Reports Submitted by States Parties to the Covenant 
Concerning Rights Covered by Articles 6 to 9, in Accordance with the First Stage of the Programme 
Established by the Econ. & Soc. Council in its Resolution 1988 (LX), Colombia, ¶ 206, U.N. Doc. 
E/1984/7/Add.21/Rev.1 (Jan. 28, 1986). 
 311. The 1986 report of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, for instance, opens with a 
statement reading: “Today the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has been turned into a people’s 
paradise, where all the people are leading a happy life while working and studying to their heart’s 
content without any worries about food, clothing and medical treatment.” Econ. & Soc. Council, 
Implementation of the ICESCR, Initial Reports Submitted by States Parties to the Covenant, in 
Accordance with Council Resolution 1988 (LX), Concerning Rights Covered by Articles 10 to 12, 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. E/1986/3/Add.5 (Nov. 5, 1986). That 
perspective negates the existence or even the possibility of socioeconomic inequalities. 
 312. See, e.g., Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Reports Submitted in 
Accordance with Council Resolution 1988 (LX) by States Parties to the Covenant Concerning Rights 
Covered by Articles 6 to 9, Canada, 312, U.N. Doc. E/1978/8/Add.32 (Aug. 7, 1981). 
 313. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Second Periodic Reports Submitted 
by States Parties Under Article 16 and 17 of the Covenant in Accordance with the Programme 
Established by Econ. & Soc. Council Resolution 1988/4, Addendum: Mexico, ¶ 3, U.N Doc. 
E/1990/6/Add.4 (Jan. 20, 1993); Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Initial 
Reports Submitted by States Parties to the Covenant Concerning Rights Covered by Articles 10 to 12 
in Accordance with the Second Stage of the Programme Established by the Econ. & Soc. Council in its 
Resolution 1988 (LX), Nicaragua, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. E/1986/3/Add.16 (June 14, 1993). 
 314. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Second Periodic Reports Submitted 
by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, Addendum: Portugal, U.N. Doc. 
E/1990/6/Add.6 (July 22, 1994); Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Third 
Periodic Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant in accordance 
with the Programmes Established by Econ. & Soc. Council Resolution 1988/4, Addendum: Sweden, 
U.N. Doc. E/1994/104/Add.1 (July 29, 1994); Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, 
Initial Reports Submitted by States Parties to the Covenant Concerning Rights Covered by Articles 10 
to 12 in Accordance with the Second Stage of the Programme Established by the Econ. & Soc. Council 
in its Resolution 1988 (LX), Addendum: Philippines, U.N. Doc. E/1986/3/Add.17 (Sept. 15, 1994); 
Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Initial Reports Submitted by States Parties 
Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, Addendum: Paraguay, U.N. Doc. E/1990/5/Add.23 (Jan. 
24, 1995). 
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shifts in the social policies states discussed in their reports. After a 
transformation, Eastern European states came to appreciate market 
mechanisms, individualism, and multiparty democracy.
315
 Western-type 
welfare statism quickly became a model for their social policies. “Social 
insurance” was turned into a contribution-based scheme, relying on 
individual initiative and responsibility.
316
 “Poverty” was to be addressed 
through regimes of social assistance or social welfare targeting the “poor” 
or the “vulnerable” sections of the population.317 Latin American countries 
moved to reinterpret their policies of development. The policies geared 
toward “economic development” gave way to policies aiming at 
“economic and social development,” “social development,” or “human 
development.” Colombia, for instance, addressed the change quite openly. 
According to the 1994 report of Colombia, its new policy was about 
dealing with “the problem of poverty” and accelerating “economic 
growth.”318 When doing so, the report went on, Colombia needed to 
concentrate on the “most essential social obligations” and “the poorest 
people” as the beneficiaries of government spending.319 The 1995 report of 
Guyana spoke of “reordered priorities,” and the government’s will to 
“direct[] more resources to the critical areas of health, education and 
housing.”320 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela took a similar stance, as did India, China, Cambodia, the 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Nepal, Iran, Syria, Yemen, Libya, 
 
 
 315. See, e.g., Tomeš, supra note 267, at 22, 40–46 (describing the major changes the Eastern 
European social security systems went through after transformation). 
 316. See, e.g., the comments of Estonia on the pension reform of the late 1990s that was supposed 
to reorganize the pension system along three different “pillars” involving various degrees of state and 
private party involvement. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Initial Reports 
Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, Addendum: Estonia, ¶¶ 240–
50, U.N. Doc. E/1990/5/Add.51 (Oct. 2, 2001). 
 317. See, again, id. ¶ 305, stating: “Subsistence benefit is paid to persons who reside on the 
territory . . . and whose monthly income is below the minimum subsistence level set by the 
Government.” Similar with respect to family allowances, see the 1998 report of Kyrgyzstan, declaring: 
“State social protection of the family is currently very closely targeted, and takes the form of payment 
of a monthly benefit to poor households.” Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, 
Initial Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, Addendum: 
Kyrgyzstan, ¶ 134, U.N. Doc. E/1990/5/Add.42 (Feb. 26, 1998). 
 318. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Third Periodic Reports Submitted by 
States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, Addendum: Colombia, ¶ 126, U.N. Doc. 
E/1994/104/Add.2 (Aug. 15, 1994). 
 319. Id. ¶ 127. 
 320. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the ICESCR, Initial Reports Submitted by States 
Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, Addendum: Guyana, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. 
E/1990/5/Add.27 (Aug. 7, 1995). 
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Tunisia, Morocco, Kenya, Senegal, Rwanda, and Madagascar.
321
 All these 
countries adhered, in one way or the other, to “social development.” 
Three indicators capture these shifts in numbers. The first indicator is 
the incidence of the word “poverty” appearing in state party reports. The 
word “poverty” is rarely used in the first decade of the reporting 
mechanism (1977 to 1986). Only 8% of the reports (n = 225) did so, most 
of them in passing. In the last reporting decade (2000 to 2009), 83% of the 
reports dealt with poverty, and they did so extensively. The average word 
count per report reached 30 (n = 144) in the last period. States made an 
effort to describe who the “vulnerable” groups were, to elaborate on 
regional particularities, to outline the macroeconomic context of the 
phenomenon (GNP, income per capita), and to go into the causes of 
poverty (e.g., armed conflict, weak economy, lack of human capital, or 
ineffectiveness of national policies). States even engaged with the 
technicalities of poverty research, such as absolute or relative poverty 
lines, the depth of poverty, poverty coefficients, definitions of basic needs, 
the features of poor households, the gender breakdown, or the spatial 
dimension of poverty. The second indicator is the incidence of references 
to policies or instruments designed to mitigate socioeconomic inequalities. 
That indicator indeed suggests that socialist planning or developmental 
thinking left little room for acknowledging inequalities. The reports of the 
first reporting period (1977 to 1986) include 60 reports relying on socialist 
planning or economic development (n = 175). Only 18% of these reports 
mentioned policies counterbalancing social inequalities, in comparison to 
50% of the other reports. The balance is very different for the reporting 
period from 2000 to 2009 where only 5 reports still expressly drew on 
economic development (n = 144). Of the 144 reports, almost 90% talked 
about policies mitigating socioeconomic inequalities. The third indicator is 
the incidence of references to social cash transfers (as a particular 
instrument intended to accommodate people in poverty). That indicator 
points in the same direction. The incidence grew significantly. Of all the 
reports commenting on ICESCR Article 9 from 1977 to 1986 (n = 99), 
only 30% mentioned targeted cash transfers in comparison to 72% of the 
reports submitted from 2000 to 2009. For the reports commenting of 
ICESCR Article 11 the numbers are 31% and 71% respectively.
322
  
 
 
 321. Source: ICESCR-SPR 2011, revised 2012. 
 322. For an overview on the emergence of state policies relying on social cash transfers, see Lutz 
Leisering, Extending Social Security to the Excluded: Are Social Cash Transfers to the Poor an 
Appropriate Way of Fighting Poverty in Developing Countries?, 9 GLOBAL SOC. POL’Y 246 (2009); 
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D. International Social Citizenship? 
The shift of states’ talk under ICESCR Articles 9 and 11 is significant 
from the perspective of both politics and law. 
The states parties to the ICESCR clearly recalibrated their reading of 
the core content of social rights. The (former) faith in economic growth as 
the motor of social justice is almost completely gone. Policies were now 
directed towards combating poverty, aiming at the weak, the ones defined 
as the most vulnerable. “Targeting” became a buzzword for states across 
the globe as they increasingly paid attention to individual welfare. Still, 
the measures employed by the states vary greatly. For OECD states and 
Eastern European transformation states, “targeting” mainly relates to 
social cash transfers meant to secure individual subsistence (social 
assistance). Social assistance laws usually carefully circumscribe the 
beneficiaries in order to make sure that public money is directed towards 
people in need only. For developing countries, “targeting” primarily 
extends to assistance in kind. Developing countries target beneficiaries 
when it comes to access to training for employment or food production, 
support for micro-enterprises, health care, the hand-out of nutrition-
supplements, access to land (land reform), water or sanitation, the 
provision of means of production, or to specifically earmarked cash 
transfers, such as food allowances, housing allowances, or family benefits. 
Moreover, the mechanisms for targeting differ. OECD states and 
transformation states tend to rely on means testing, whereas developing 
countries tend to rely on targeting that is group-based (e.g., indigenous 
people or large families), age-based (children under the age of three or five 
or the elderly), gender-based, or region-based. Finally, targeted measures 
seem particularly volatile in developing countries. State party reports 
seldom describe their legal background. States simply refer to “programs,” 
and it remains unclear whether these programs have a firm basis in law. 
Targeted measures may be financed by international donors administered 
by national or international NGOs, or by state-dominated charities, such as 
the Zakat House located in Kuwait City.  
From the perspective of law, the recalibration of state policies under 
ICESCR Articles 9 and 11 reflects upon the meaning of these rights.
323
 For 
 
 
JOSEPH HANLON, ARMANDO BARRIENTOS & DAVID HULME, JUST GIVE MONEY TO THE POOR: THE 
DEVELOPMENT REVOLUTION FROM THE GLOBAL SOUTH (2010). 
 323. See Mechlem, supra note 198 (elaborating on VCLT article 31(3) in greater detail and 
against the backdrop of three examples taken from the work of the Committee established under the 
ICESCR). 
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one, “poverty” has emerged as the eminent issue of social rights for states 
all over the globe. The mitigation of poverty has become a human rights 
goal that is also backed by major global actors such as the World Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund, and the UNDP. States have to pay 
attention to this goal as they design their domestic policies or cooperate 
internationally with a view to “achieving . . . the full realization of the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant.”324 In addition, the recent 
emphasis on “targeted” policies strengthens the “individual rights-
element” enshrined in those rights. That is particularly true for the rights 
under ICESCR Article 11 (adequate standard of living). The mixed 
package of economic planning, policies of economic development, and 
Western welfare policies seems to have given way to policies that 
concentrate on the welfare of individuals belonging to groups deemed 
vulnerable (individual welfare). If the reports picture state practice 
accurately, states must no longer neglect individual welfare over collective 
welfare when it comes to mitigating poverty, not even in the context of 
ICESCR Article 11.
325
 The latter shift bolsters the international layer of 
“social citizenship.” The measures states talk about are individualized (as 
they concentrate on targeted individuals). The measures are basically state-
orchestrated (though in weak states state bureaucracies may still be 
substituted by other bureaucracies or even self-help); the measures 
moderate inequalities, at least with respect to the “floor level in the 
basement of the social edifice,”326 to quote T.H. Marshall one last time. 
The measures are not conceptualized as a quid pro quo for the market 
value of the beneficiaries’ labor. In short, the reports indicate that the 
granting of social citizenship is about to become an obligation states must 
adhere to, at least when they confront poverty. Measures targeting the poor 
certainly fall short of the technical characteristics of contribution-based 
“social insurance,” yet may be summarized under the legal term “social 
 
 
 324. ICESCR, supra note 14, art. 2(1). On the obligation of states parties under article 2(1) to take 
steps to progressively realize the rights recognized herein “individually and through international 
assistance and cooperation,” see Magdalena Sepúlveda, Obligations of ‘International Assistance and 
Cooperation’ in an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, 24 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 271 (2006) (discussing the misconceptions underlying article 2(1) and 
the attempts by the Committee under the ICESCR to give guidance as to the meaning of these 
obligations). 
 325. See generally Philip Alston & Mary Robinson, The Challenges of Ensuring Mutuality, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS MUTUAL REINFORCEMENT 1 (Philip Alston & Mary 
Robinson eds., 2005) (reflecting on the added value of a rights-based approach to development 
policies). 
 326. MARSHALL, supra note 3, at 47. 
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security” (ICESCR Article 9) or the term “adequate standard of living” 
(ICESCR Article 11).
327
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This Article investigates the relevance of U.N.-sponsored economic 
and social rights for social citizenship. When Marshall theorized 
“citizenship” back in 1950, his contention was that the expansion of rights 
on the national level, from civil to political to social rights over the course 
of two centuries, eventually culminated in the birth of the European 
welfare state. According to that narrative, the welfare state was born when 
nation-states moved to grant social rights, i.e., social citizenship. Do U.N.-
sponsored economic and social rights similarly advance social citizenship 
and, per implication, some notion of welfare statism? This Article rejects 
easy assumptions in the affirmative, but also ignorance and skepticism 
common among sociologists and legal scholars. Since 1993, social 
citizenship has emerged as a human rights tenet. 
First, this Article proposes to acknowledge that U.N.-sponsored human 
rights law may have an impact on citizenship rights on the national level. 
Often, human rights recognized on the international level oblige states to 
translate these rights into national rights enforceable in a court of law. 
Citizenship may hence rightly be conceptualized as “layered,” i.e., as a 
status combining an international layer of rights with a national layer of 
rights. However, “social citizenship” is a highly specified notion, and it is 
still quite open to interpretation whether U.N.-sponsored economic and 
social rights indeed include such a dimension.  
Secondly, this Article elaborates the meaning of U.N.-sponsored 
economic and social rights in their historical context. Based on the travaux 
préparatoires of the ICESCR, the Article demonstrates that the advocates 
of these rights can be grouped along three ideological lines: liberalism, 
 
 
 327. The global consensus on a human rights-based need to fight poverty was eventually 
formalized when the Committee under the ICESCR adopted its General Comment No. 19 late in 2007, 
stressing that measures under ICESCR Article 9 included, inter alia, non-contributory schemes 
specifically targeted to those in a situation of need. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General 
Comment No. 19 on the Right to Social Security, ¶ 4(b), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/19 (Nov. 23, 2007). 
For the most recent initiatives on the global level, see SOCIAL PROTECTION FLOOR ADVISORY GROUP, 
ILO, SOCIAL PROTECTION FLOOR FOR A FAIR AND INCLUSIVE GLOBALIZATION (2011), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms 
_165750.pdf; ILO, Social Protection Floors Recommendation, ILO No. R202 (June 14, 2012); 
OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER & MAGDALENA SEPÚLVEDA, UNDERWRITING THE POOR: A GLOBAL FUND FOR 
SOCIAL PROTECTION (2012), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Food/20121009_ 
GFSP_en.pdf. 
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developmental thinking, and socialism. Each ideology left traces in clauses 
of the ICESCR; the compromises found were supposed to leave much 
leeway to the implementing states. Historically, social citizenship was not 
the dominant program for the realization of these rights. 
Third, this Article explores whether the understanding of U.N.-
sponsored economic and social rights changed subsequently, in particular 
through re-reading of the clauses by the states parties to the ICESCR. Such 
a change in reading would, if backed by state practice, change the meaning 
of the clauses of the ICESCR. The analysis of the 546 reports submitted 
under the ICESCR from 1977 to 2011 clearly shows that around 1993 the 
states’ perception and understanding of social rights changed significantly. 
At that point in time, socialism and developmental thinking were in 
retreat. Liberalism was on the rise in the Eastern European transformation 
states, but also in Asian and African states. The reports testify to a new 
ideational consensus, cross-cutting former ideological groups and shared 
by states around the world. When describing their policies under ICESCR 
Article 9 and Article 11, states nowadays focus on individual welfare 
(“targeting”), on inequality (“poverty”), and on measures providing help 
where markets fail to do so. These are the ingredients of social citizenship. 
Yet international social citizenship has distinct features. Social policies 
concentrate on the poor and cash transfers known from European contexts 
are not necessarily the instrument states resort to. Cash transfers often 
combine with provision in kind (food), access to services (health services, 
care, or training), or access to land.
328
 
Social citizenship as a human rights tenet, recognized worldwide in the 
course of the 1990’s, is certainly minimal. Its content is limited to 
subsistence, i.e., some basic floor of a human existence in dignity. And 
yet, the emergence on the global level of an individual right to a livelihood 
in dignity is a major and unexpected development. As recorded in this 
Article, the “social” encapsulated in the ICESCR was deliberately kept 
vague in the 1950’s and 1960’s. Today, we witness a broad consensus 
among states that state responsibilities under the ICESCR with respect to 
welfare also extend to individual welfare. Each human being living in 
poverty indicates that the human rights standard of the ICESCR has not 
been met. 
 
 
 328. For the aspect of access to land, see generally BENJAMIN DAVY, LAND POLICY: PLANNING 
AND THE SPATIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PROPERTY (2012) and Benjamin Davy & Sony Pellissery, The 
Citizenship Promise (Un)fulfilled: The Right to Housing in Informal Settings, 22 INT’L J. OF SOC. 
WELFARE S68 (2013) (emphasizing the creation of non-state welfare through economic and social 
practices at the margins of society).  
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